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CONGRESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
 
Brian D. Feinstein* 
 
 
In an era of increased concern over presidential power, congressional 
oversight of the executive branch constitutes a substantial—but 
underappreciated—means of influencing agency decision-making. Scholars too 
often have overlooked it, and Congress is sub-optimally designed for its 
provision, but oversight hearings have a sizeable impact on agency behavior. 
This Article provides a corrective. It presents the legal mechanisms that 
give oversight hearings their force and situates these hearings in their historical 
and legal context. In light of this framework and historical practice, the Article 
posits that ex post oversight hearings facilitate political control over the 
administrative state. Because oversight gets its bite from an implicit threat of 
legislative sanctions should an agency not change its behavior following 
hearings, however, committees’ decisions whether to pursue oversight hinge on 
the credibility of this threat.  
To test this theory, the Article introduces an original dataset of over 
14,000 agency “infractions,” i.e., agency actions that are potential subjects of 
hearings. Analysis of these data reveals, first, that oversight is most likely to 
occur when the particular preference alignment of Congress, the relevant 
committee, and the agency make the threat of new legislation credible. A second 
empirical analysis finds that, when oversight hearings do occur, they can get 
results; infractions that are subject to hearings are 18.5% less likely to recur 
compared to otherwise similar infractions that are not subject to hearings.  
These findings call into question the received wisdom regarding 
Congress’s role in governance. Whereas scholars focused on the political 
branches’ formal powers see Congress as a branch in decline, a more nuanced 
picture emerges when one also considers “soft powers,” like oversight. These 
findings offer a blueprint for greater congressional involvement in 
administration: to increase Congress’s role in governance, committee 
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membership rosters should be representative of the larger legislature and 
committees with overlapping jurisdictions should be established. By redesigning 
its internal structure, Congress can promote more frequent oversight and, 
because oversight can be consequential, thereby strengthens Congress as a 
check on presidential administration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In retrospect, it was only a blip on the media’s radar screen. But in the 
summer of 2000, tire safety held the public’s attention.1 That summer, the nation 
learned that failed Firestone tires were responsible for over one hundred deaths 
during the previous several years.2 Concerned about the perceived inability of the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to identify and 
adequately address the defect,3 Congress enacted legislation requiring the agency to 
establish a data-reporting and analysis system by mid-2002 under which 
manufacturers must submit to NHTSA information on accident-related claims.4 
Yet NHTSA, with more industry-friendly officials at the helm following the 
2000 election,5 dragged its feet.6 In 2002, a House subcommittee convened a 
hearing, where several legislators sharply criticized NHTSA’s administrator for the 
agency’s inaction concerning the defect information system.7 
Following the hearing, NHTSA made swift progress, completing the first 
phase of the system just nine months later.8 Two years after that, the agency issued 
the first recall based on analysis using the new system—which, incredibly, had 
become the government’s largest non-military computer database.9 
                                                     
1 See VANDERBILT TELEVISION NEWS ARCHIVE (Dec. 30, 2016), https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/search 
(showing that the ABC, CBS, and NBC evening news programs aired 108 stories concerning 
“Firestone” or “tire safety” between July 1, 2000 and September 30, 2000). 
2 Keith Bradsher, More deaths are attributed to faulty Firestone tires, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2000, at 
2.  
3 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 106-423, at 1 (2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain). 
4 Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-414, 3(b), 114 Stat. at 1801-02 (2000) (setting a June 30, 2002 deadline for creation 
of the system for death, injury, and property claims). 
5 See Myron Levin and Alan C. Miller, Industries get quiet protection from lawsuits, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2006, at A1. 
6 See Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), Department of Transportation, Review of the Office of 
Defects Investigation, Jan. 3, 2002 (Report No. MH-2002-071), at 5. 
7 See Hearing, Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, Implementation of the TREAD Act, Feb. 28, 
2002, at 5-6 (Statement of Full Committee Ranking Member John Dingell (D-MI)); id. at 28 
(Statement of Subcommittee Chair Cliff Stearns (R-FL)). 
8 OIG, Department of Transportation, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects Investigation, Sept. 23, 
2004 (Report No. MH-2004-088), at 5. The final phase of the system was completed in mid-2004. Id.  
9 Kevin M. McDonald, Separations, Blow-outs, and Fallout: A TREADise on the Regulatory 
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This sequence of events—Congress passes a law, the agency delays 
implementation, Congress critiques the agency’s inaction, and the agency 
improves—suggests that congressional pressure caused an otherwise recalcitrant 
agency to act.10 Yet the episode stands outside of the accepted view of congressional 
power. When scholars typically discuss Congress’s role, they tend to focus on the 
branch’s well-known, direct powers: primarily its lawmaking function, along with 
appropriations and appointments.11 Recent work on Congress’s other powers—most 
notably Josh Chafetz’s study of Congress’s “soft powers” concerning the freedom of 
speech or debate and each chamber’s powers to establish cameral rules and 
discipline its members—has begun to challenge this conventional focus on the 
institution’s legislative powers.12 Yet mechanisms, like oversight, that lie beyond 
those delineated in the Constitution remain underappreciated—despite the significant 
resources that Congress expends performing these functions.13 Given this incomplete 
picture, it is not surprising that the received wisdom holds that Congress’s role in 
policymaking, relative to that of the President, is diminished.14  
                                                                                                                                                      
Aftermath of the Ford-Firestone Tire Recall, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 1073, 1177-78 (2004). 
10 See Rep. Fred Upton, Press Release, Upton Announces Recall on Ford Excursion Firestone Tires 
Issued between 2000 and 2003, Feb. 26, 2004, available on-line at 
http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20050107134914/http://www.house.gov/upton/press/press-02-27-
04.html (last accessed Jan. 18, 2017) (credit-claiming by Rep. Upton, the principal sponsor of the Act 
and major participant in the 2002 hearing, concerning the 2004 recall). 
11 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 715, 724 (2012) (noting that 
Congress’s “hard powers,” or its formal means of coercion, e.g., legislation, the power of the purse, 
impeachment, etc., “tend to be more familiar” than Congress’s “soft powers,” which presumably 
include oversight); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV 61, 65 
(2006) (noting that “the dominant image” of Congress’s role in administration emphasizes its 
lawmaking function, and that, once a law has been passed, “the only mechanisms that prevent the 
administration from ignoring Congress’s goals altogether are judicial review and the possibility of 
further legislation”).  
12 JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 201-301 (2017). 
13 See id. Data collected for this Article show that, each year in recent Congresses, House committees 
and subcommittees convene a median of 221 critical hearings concerning agencies; for Senate 
committees and subcommittees, the figure is 82 hearings annually. For both chambers, these figures 
constitute marked increases from a generation ago.  
14 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The 
Afterlife of American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1938 (2014), ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010); BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); Sanford Levinson & Jack 
Balkin, Constiutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010); 
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: Presidential Power from 
Washington to Bush (2008); THOMAS MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
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This Article provides a corrective. It contends that, as NHTSA’s response to 
congressional oversight hearings exemplifies, hearings provide Congress with a 
powerful tool to influence administration. This Article tests this theory with an 
original dataset of 14,431 agency “infractions,” which, as explained infra, comprise 
the set of issues from which Congress tends to select its subjects for oversight 
hearings. These infractions include critiques regarding a wide variety of regulatory 
implementation, enforcement, and personnel issues across all executive departments 
and major independent agencies, as raised in inspector-general reports, Government 
Accountability Office “top challenges” lists, and newspaper editorials. For each 
infraction, I identify, first, whether Congress held a hearing on the subject within one 
year after its mention and, second, whether the infraction reappeared in the dataset in 
the next year.  
The use of this large-scale dataset allows for the comparison of agency 
actions that are subject to oversight hearings with otherwise similar agency actions 
for which Congress does not hold hearings. After all, one cannot know the 
independent effect of the TREAD Act implementation hearing on NHTSA’s later 
actions without comparing that episode to a (hypothetical) other NHTSA 
implementation issue on which Congress did not hold hearings. This effort, the first 
large-scale, quantitative study of congressional oversight, answers two questions: 
under what conditions will oversight occur, and is this activity consequential? Taken 
together, answers to these questions will shed light on the broader question of 
whether oversight enables Congress to exert a degree of ex post control over the 
administrative state following legislative enactments. 
Empirical analysis concerning the first question shows that the particular 
preference alignment of Congress, the relevant committee, and the relevant agency 
affect whether oversight occurs concerning a given infraction. This finding is 
attributable to Congress’s bifurcated structure: committees are empowered to 
convene hearings, but only the full legislature may sanction agencies for continued 
non-compliance following hearings. This structure encourages committees to ignore 
some infractions that Congress might prefer to probe, based on the committees’ fears 
that convening hearings could motivate Congress to enact legislative changes that the 
committees oppose. Essentially, committees—mindful that their parent chamber’s 
preferences may differ from their own—make strategic decisions concerning which 
agencies they take to task and which they ignore.15 
                                                                                                                                                      
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACE (2006); William P. Marshall, 
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided 
Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2449 (2006). 
15 See J. R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition for Control of Delegated 
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A second analysis finds that, when it occurs, oversight often is consequential, 
changing agency behavior for a statistically significant 18.5% of infractions, relative 
to otherwise similar infractions for which oversight does not occur. To put that figure 
in perspective: agencies commit an average of 656 infractions per year, of which 239 
infractions continue (or reoccur) the next year; by holding oversight hearings, 
Congress prevents an additional 47 infractions per year from reappearing in the 
dataset in the next year on average. Oversight alters agency behavior—moving it 
towards congressional preferences on issues ranging from the level of regulatory 
enforcement to the creation of programs that stretch agencies’ statutory authority, as 
well as concerning more run-of-the-mill issues such as waste, fraud, and abuse—an 
average of 89 times per year. 
These findings have implications for our understanding of the roles that all 
three branches play in the administrative state. First, the finding that committees 
strategically decline to hold hearings based on the preference alignment of Congress, 
the committee, and the relevant agency shows a subtle majoritarian dynamic at work 
in Congress’s internal organization. Although committee-based oversight can be 
remarkably impactful, outlier committees are less likely to engage in oversight. 
Thus, the existence of a bifurcated congressional principal provides a majoritarian 
check on unrepresentative committees—and cuts against arguments favoring strong 
presidential administration based on the premise that congressional control 
supposedly involves control by outlier committees.  
Prescriptively, that finding suggests that those interested in enhancing 
Congress’s capacity ought to do away with two of the branch’s institutional features: 
legislators’ self-selection onto committees and the granting of exclusive jurisdictions 
to committees. The current practice of allowing legislators to select their committee 
assignments yields committees that are unrepresentative of floor preferences. As 
explained infra, outlier committees refrain from convening oversight hearings in 
instances where Congress would prefer hearings to occur. Thus, creating committees 
that reflect congressional preferences would foster greater oversight. Similarly, 
granting a single committee property rights to oversee a given agency reduces the 
likelihood that the agency will be subject to oversight if that committee’s preferences 
are not properly aligned with those of Congress and the agency. Accordingly, 
placing agencies under the non-exclusive control of multiple committees would 
encourage greater oversight. 
Second, the finding that oversight can substantially alter agency behavior 
                                                                                                                                                      
Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1447 (2003); Steven Shimberg, Checks and Balance: Limitations on the 
Power of Congressional Oversight, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 245 (1991). 
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indicates that Congress’s position vis-à-vis the White House is not as diminished as 
some suggest. In recent years, scholars have begun to push back against the 
conventional perception of an enfeebled Congress.16 This Article contributes to this 
nascent reassessment by adding oversight as among Congress’s soft powers that 
provide the branch with a source of control over administrative agencies.17  
Finally, these findings suggest that concerns that administrative law doctrines 
leave the executive branch without supervision deserve reconsideration. In recent 
years, a growing chorus of jurists and scholars has voiced concerns that deference 
doctrines strip agencies of any checks, judicial or legislative, on their actions.18 That 
oversight provides Congress with a powerful mechanism to influence agency 
behavior—and that Congress has the ability to restructure its internal institutions to 
promote even greater oversight, should it so desire—belies this notion. Thus, these 
findings provide a rejoinder to critics of judicial deference to agencies on these 
grounds.   
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the 
mechanics of congressional oversight, including the historical practices and legal 
framework that shape how Congress conducts oversight. Part II examines the 
circumstances in which agencies are subject to oversight or ignored, emphasizing 
how congressional institutions—specifically, the committee system—impact the 
branch’s oversight activities. Part III assesses whether oversight is consequential, 
examining the extent to which hearings alter future agency behavior. Finally, Part IV 
discusses implications of these findings and presents a blueprint for Congress to 
better utilize its oversight function as a check on growing executive authority. 
I. FUNDAMENTALS 
A. Hearings and Alternatives 
This Article examines one form of congressional monitoring of the 
administrative state: oversight hearings convened by committees and subcommittees. 
Congress’s oversight work, naturally, is not limited to on-the-record hearings.19 
                                                     
16 See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 12, at 37; David Mayhew, Congress as a Handler of Challenges: 
The Historical Record, 29 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 185, 211 (2015); Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive 
(by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 779-80 (2012). 
17 Cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 573 (2008) (on the persuasive influence of post-enactment congressional or cameral 
resolutions). 
18 See infra Section IV.E. 
19See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122. 
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Actions ranging from informal, largely consequence-less discussions between 
committee staffers and members of the senior executive service to, at the farthest 
extreme, presidential impeachment and conviction trials all can be considered 
oversight. Most oversight activity occurs at the lower end of this spectrum, with 
legislators, staff members, and congressional support agencies, most prominently the 
Government Accountability Office, communicating with agency personnel both to 
receive information and to convey recommendations.20 Operating under time and 
resource constraints, legislators outsource some of this information-gathering to 
affected interest groups and provide mechanisms by which these groups can alert 
allied legislators of disfavored agency action.21 
More broadly, members of Congress also exert ex post influence over the 
administrative state via the appropriations process, information-forcing reporting 
requirements, the confirmation process, and casework.22 Committee-based legislative 
vetoes—which persist as tacit understandings between committees and agencies in 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding in Immigration and Naturalization Service 
v. Chadha that the mechanism is unconstitutional—provide another means of ex post 
control.23 In a sense, any congressional intervention in the executive branch could be 
viewed as performance of Congress’s oversight function.24 Seen in this light, Carl 
Friedrich’s observation that policymaking “is a continuous process, the formation of 
which is inseparable from its execution” holds true.25 
That virtually any legislative intervention that lies beyond Congress’s formal 
powers can be classified as oversight stymies potential comparisons of the relative 
efficacy of Congress’s many means of influencing the administrative state. For one, 
legislators utilize these mechanisms—e.g., committee hearings, legislative support 
agency audits, casework, informal staff contacts, etc.—for different purposes; one 
                                                     
20 JOEL ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 132 
(1990).  
21 CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN, SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION 13 (1989). 
22 See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1482 (2015). 
23 See Louis Fisher, Legislative Vetoes After Chadha, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, May 2, 2005 
(identifying hundreds of legislative vetoes in effect in 2005); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
24 See FREDERICK KAISER, WALTER OLESZEK, AND TODD TATELMAN, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
MANUAL 78-80 (2011) (classifying casework, audits, and the monitoring of the Federal Register as 
forms of oversight).  
25 Carl J. Friedrich, Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility, in CARL J. 
FRIEDRICH AND EDWARD MASON, EDS., PUBLIC POLICY 117 (1940).  
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would not expect, for instance, a full-day hearing to investigate an undelivered 
Social Security check. Further, with so many of these Congress-agency contacts 
being informal and unrecorded (e.g., staff-level phone conversations), measurement 
problems abound.  
Thus, the scope of this Article is more limited; it focuses exclusively on 
committee and subcommittee oversight hearings, which are the most direct, 
observable form of congressional monitoring. Congress holds hundreds of hearings 
annually, most of which occur in committees and subcommittees that have 
jurisdictional mandates and dedicated staff resources to perform this function.26 
These hearings are the most public, performative, high-stakes manner in which 
Congress oversees the administrative state.27 
Hearings—more than any other form of monitoring—enjoy a legal 
framework that encourages their success. Most importantly, committees are 
authorized to issue subpoenas to compel testimony at hearings.28 If an individual 
fails to comply with a subpoena, either chamber may cite that individual for 
contempt of Congress via one of three mechanisms: Congress’s inherent contempt 
power,29 a criminal contempt statute available to both chambers,30 or a civil 
contempt statute available to the Senate.31 In addition, witnesses that, whether under 
oath or not, knowingly make a false statement concerning a material issue in the 
presence of a quorum of committee members are subject to prosecution.32 Full 
committees, by a two-thirds vote, also have the power to compel a witness’s 
testimony following that individual’s assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.33 In these circumstances, the committee may 
compel that witness’s testimony by obtaining a court order granting the witness 
                                                     
26 See Clerk of the House of Representatives, List of Standing Committees, Dec. 5, 2016, available on-
line at http://clerk.house.gov/committee_info/scsoal.pdf (last accessed Jan. 2, 2017) (listing oversight 
subcommittees nested in ten House authorization committees, as well as the Committee on Oversight 
& Government Reform, which contains six subcommittees). 
27 See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122. 
28 See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975) (reaffirming the constitutionality 
of this subpoena power); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Rule XI (authorizing all 
standing committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas); SENATE MANUAL, Rule XXVI (similar).  
29 See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).  
30 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 & 194. 
31 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288d and 28 U.S.C. § 1365.  
32 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), (c)(2). 
33 KAISER, ET AL., supra note 24, at 32. 
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immunity from future criminal prosecution.34 
B. Historical Practice 
As with many congressional functions, committee oversight hearings trace 
their origins to the British Parliament.35 During the 1680s—roughly 
contemporaneous with the expansion of parliamentary power in the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688—parliamentary committees investigated alleged 
misappropriations of funds by the navy, dissatisfaction with the conduct of the 
Williamite War in Ireland, and the East India Company’s declaration of martial law 
in a South Pacific island.36 Colonial legislatures in America adopted the practice, 
investigating, inter alia, corruption in the granting of corporate charters, misconduct 
by gubernatorial officials, and the disbursement of public funds.37  
The U.S. Congress first addressed the question of whether it has the authority 
to oversee executive affairs on March 27, 1792.38 On that date, the House voted 
down a resolution directing the President to investigate the army’s defeat by 
Shawnee and Miami forces in the Battle of the Wabash.39 In its place, the House 
adopted an alternative resolution “empower[ing] [a House investigative committee] 
to call for such persons, papers, and records, as may be necessary to assist their 
inquiries.”40 
From the early Republic until the 1910s, congressional oversight occurred on 
an ad hoc basis, with most investigations conducted by short-term committees 
established to examine discrete subjects.41 Investigations typically occurred every 
few years during this period.42 The frequency and depth of investigations began to 
increase in the early twentieth century. This development is attributable to the 
confluence of two related trends: the rise of the Progressive movement and the 
                                                     
34 Id. 
35 See generally James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of 
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 162 (1926).  
36 See id.  
37 See id. at 165-66.  
38 Id. at 170. 
39 Id. 
40 3 ANN. CONG. 490-94 (1792). 
41 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA’S CONGRESS: ACTIONS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE, JAMES MADISON 
THROUGH NEWT Gingrich 82-83 (2002); Landis, supra note 35, at 171-210. 
42 See MAYHEW, supra; Landis, supra note 35. 
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growing popularity of investigatory journalists known as muckrakers.43 
Congressional attention to oversight continued to increase through World War II, 
when Congress largely tabled its legislative function in favor of monitoring the war 
effort, most prominently through the career-making Truman Committee.44  
From the mid-twentieth century through the present, oversight hearings have 
been a near-constant presence in Congress.45 The vast majority of hearings during 
this period—and, hence, the vast majority of hearings analyzed in this Article—
probe relatively narrow subjects, e.g., the Bureau of Land Management’s fee 
schedules for agricultural and extractive uses of public land, the National Weather 
Service’s efforts to commercialize its intellectual property, etc. Occasionally, 
however, Congress addresses high-profile subjects, conducting compelling, televised 
hearings that become embedded in the public conscience.46 Often, a single proper 
noun is all that is needed to evoke these complex, dramatic events: Kefauver, 
McCarthy, Watergate, Iran-Contra, Benghazi.  
Although high-profile hearings that occurred during the period under study in 
this Article are included in my analysis, they are only part of the story. This project’s 
aims are broader: to shine a light on Congress’s often overlooked, routine oversight 
of administrative agencies, showing that the use of this basic function enables 
Congress to influence executive-branch outcomes following the passage of laws. 
C. Legal Authority 
The legal framework for the current oversight regime is a product of Supreme 
Court case law, largely from the early- to mid-twentieth century, that defines the 
constitutionally permissible scope of congressional investigations, and a combination 
of public law and congressional rules, enacted in bursts of reform-minded legislative 
activity during the 1940s and 1970s, that establishes the institutional structures 
through which Congress conducts oversight.  
Constitutional Authority 
Although the Constitution does not expressly grant Congress the power to 
conduct oversight, the Supreme Court has held that the “power of the Congress to 
                                                     
43 See MAYHEW, supra note 41. 
44 See id. 
45 See DOUGLAS L. KRINER & ERIC SCHICKLER, INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT 38 (2016). 
46 See MAYHEW, supra note 41, at 82-90.  
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conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”47 Thus, Congress’s 
oversight powers are implied by the Constitution and are coterminous with the 
branch’s lawmaking powers.48 This connection between oversight and lawmaking is 
crucial; Congress’s oversight power must be applied “in aid of the legislative 
function.”49 
In determining whether a committee hearing meets this constitutional 
requirement, the Supreme Court adopts a broad definition of “legislative function.” 
For instance, in McGrain v. Daugherty, the Court held that a Senate investigation 
into the Teapot Dome scandal was constitutionally valid,50 despite the vagueness of 
the language in the Senate resolution authorizing the hearings: to obtain “information 
necessary as a basis for such legislative and other action as the Senate may deem 
necessary and proper.”51 Acknowledging that “[a]n express avowal of the object [of 
the hearings] would have been better,” the Court nonetheless held that the Senate’s 
stated purpose was constitutionally adequate. “The only legitimate object the Senate 
could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating,” the Court 
concluded, “and we think the subject matter was such that the presumption should be 
indulged that this was the real object.”52 
This broad definition of legislative purpose notwithstanding, the Supreme 
Court does not give Congress carte blanche to conduct hearings. Since congressional 
investigations resemble aspects of both the legislative and judicial processes, it is 
unsurprising that the Court has held that variants of well-established limits on these 
processes also apply to oversight hearings.53 For example, because Congress cannot 
enact laws that infringe on the First Amendment, neither can it compel testimony at 
hearings whose only conceivable legislative purpose would infringe on the First 
Amendment. In Watkins v. United States, for instance, the Court reversed on First 
                                                     
47 Watkins v. U.S., 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
48 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 435 (1977); Eastland, 421 U.S. 491; 
Barenblatt v. U.S., 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins, 354 U.S. 178; McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 
(1927). 
49 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880). 
50 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
51 CONG. REC. 68th Cong. 1st Sess. 7215-17. 
52 273 U.S. at 178. 
53 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959) (“Congress … must exercise its 
[investigative] powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, 
more particularly in the context of [the oversight activities in] this case the relevant limitations of the 
Bill of Rights.”). 
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Amendment grounds a conviction for contempt of Congress following a union 
official’s refusal to testify before the House Committee on Un-American Activities 
on alleged communist involvement in organized labor.54 The Watkins Court reasoned 
that since “an investigation is part of lawmaking,” it is “subject to the command that 
the Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or 
assembly.”55 
The Supreme Court also has indicated in dicta that the Fourth Amendment’s 
bar on unreasonable searches and seizures extends to congressional investigations. In 
McPhaul v. United States—another case originating with an Un-American Activities 
Committee investigation—the Court applied the same standard to assess the 
reasonableness of the committee’s subpoenas as it applied to Fourth Amendment 
challenges to subpoenas issued in judicial and administrative proceedings.56 
Concerning the Fifth Amendment, the Court has stated in dicta that the 
privilege against self-incrimination is available to witnesses in congressional 
investigations,57 despite the amendment’s express reference to persons “in any 
criminal case.”58 The Due Process Clause also applies to congressional 
investigations, mandating that “the pertinency of the interrogation to the topic under 
the congressional committee’s inquiry must be brought home to the witness at the 
time the questions are put to him.”59 
Beyond the aforementioned constitutional limitations, however, courts are 
reluctant to apply procedural safeguards that are typically associated with judicial 
proceedings to the congressional context. For instance, there is no congressional 
analogue to the right of a defendant in a judicial proceeding to cross-examine 
witnesses pursuant to the Due Process and Confrontation clauses.60 Courts are even 
more deferential to Congress concerning the application of common-law privileges 
to oversight hearings.61 For example, committees exercise complete discretion over 
                                                     
54 354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
55 Id. at 197. 
56 364 U.S. 372, 382-83 (1960). 
57 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
59 Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467-68 (1961); see also Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 123-24, 
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 214-15. 
60 See U.S. v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  
61 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d. 21, 39 (D.D.C. 1998) aff'’d in part, rev’d in 
part on other grounds sub nom. In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting an assertion 
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whether to grant testimonial privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege, to 
witnesses.62 The judiciary’s unwillingness to extend other constitutional and 
common-law protections present in the judicial process to congressional 
investigations arguably is itself rooted in the Constitution; this general deference to 
congressional committees to devise their own procedural safeguards finds support in 
the Rules of Proceedings Clause.63 
Statutory Authority 
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 provides the foundation for the 
contemporary Congress’s oversight work.64 The Act mandates that all House and 
Senate standing committees “exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution [of 
laws] by the administrative agencies,” and provided committees with enhanced 
tools—namely, professional committee staffs and strengthened congressional 
support agencies—to help achieve this goal.65 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1970 and the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 further increased committee staffs 
and the scope and budgets of congressional support agencies.66 Beginning in the late 
1970s, Congress augmented its information-gathering abilities—or, depending on 
one’s perspective, outsourced much of this tedious and resource-intensive function to 
the executive branch itself—by establishing positions within the executive branch 
charged with issuing reports to Congress and the general public;67 mandating that the 
executive periodically provide Congress with certain pre-specified information;68 
and protecting executive branch whistleblowers from reprisal.69 
                                                                                                                                                      
of work-product immunity by the White House Counsel’s Office, based on the Office’s failure to 
show that potential future congressional investigations constitute adversarial proceedings of the type 
for which the privilege ordinarily may apply); 
62 See id.  
63 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings …”). 
64 See Beermann, supra note 11, at 122; see also Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 
Stat. 812 (codified 2 U.S.C. § 31). 
65 Legislative Reorganization Act, supra. 
66 Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 325-29; Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 84 
Stat. 1168-71, 1173-79, 1181-85. 
67 See Inspector General Reform Act of 2008; Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, 107 Stat. 2838 
(1990); Inspector General Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978). 
68 See GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 3866-84 (2010); Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995, 109 Stat. 163 (1995); Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 285-96 
(1993). 
69 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, 123 Stat. 3034 (2010); Whistleblower Protection Act 
 
Congress in the Administrative State 
 
15 
 
Cameral Rules 
Oversight hearings take place exclusively in committees and 
subcommittees.70 As a formal matter, only the chair of the relevant committees or 
subcommittee typically may call a hearing.71 In many committees, however, well-
established norms dictate that the chair will call a hearing at the behest of a 
significant number—often, but not always, a majority—of the group’s majority party 
membership.72 Once called, a hearing in a House committee or subcommittee may be 
conducted if at least two committee or subcommittee members are in attendance; for 
most Senate committees and subcommittees, hearings may be held with only one 
member present.73 Minority party members enjoy no formal rights to hold hearings 
or issue subpoenas.74 Still, minority party members may participate fully in the 
questioning of witnesses and, in the House, also may call their own witnesses at the 
request of a majority of the minority members.75 
II. OCCURRENCE 
Given Congress’s substantial and deep-rooted oversight authority, the natural 
next question is: when does Congress use this power? Specifically, when will 
Congress’s committees engage in oversight? This Part provides a theory, grounded 
in the legislative branch’s internal structure, to explain why committees convene 
oversight hearings regarding certain agency actions and ignore others. This theory 
generates three hypotheses, all of which relate to the concept that the particular 
preference alignment of the relevant political actors affects whether oversight occurs 
concerning the given agency action. To test the theory, this Part introduces an 
original dataset of over 14,000 agency “infractions,” or potential subjects for 
hearings, and examines which of these infractions cause congressional overseers to 
act and which do not.  
                                                                                                                                                      
of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1213 et seq. (2000 ed. & Supp. III). 
70 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE 113TH CONGRESS, Rule X; SENATE 
MANUAL, Rule XXV, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/SMAN-
112/pdf/SMAN-112.pdf.  
71 KAISER, ET AL., supra note 24, at 69. 
72 KAISER, ET AL., supra. 
73 Id. at 30. 
74 Id. at 69. 
75 Id.  
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A. Theory 
Congress as a Bifurcated Principal 
While committee hearings may have several purposes and be directed at 
multiple audiences, I posit that two audiences within government—the agency 
subject to hearings and the overall legislative branch—often are particularly 
important. Regarding the former audience, committee-based oversight serves as a 
warning to the targeted agency: shape up or face sanctions.76 Considering the 
nontrivial time and resource costs associated with convening a hearing, doing so 
provides a costly signal to the agency, conveying the committee’s resolve.77 If the 
agency does not alter its behavior to be more consistent with committee preferences, 
the committee could introduce legislation sanctioning the offending agency, and, if 
that legislation passes, the agency could face sizeable negative consequences.78 Thus, 
oversight hearings provide powerful inducements to the targeted agency, based on 
the legislative branch’s potential response should the agency not modify its 
behavior.79  
Concerning the latter audience, committee hearings provide a signal to the 
overall legislative branch—which may have previously overlooked the agency’s 
issue area—that legislative sanctions may be necessary. Since committees possess 
limited independent power to sanction wayward agencies, oversight hearings are 
consequential largely based on the signal that they provide to the larger legislative 
branch, placing previously overlooked issues and agencies on the congressional 
agenda.80 This agenda-setting function is not merely a byproduct of holding 
                                                     
76 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 111 (1974) (“[Legislators] can 
affect the way legislation is implemented by giving postenactment cues to the bureaucracy. Behind 
the cues lies the threat of future legislation, but in a relation of anticipated responses the cues may be 
sufficient.”). 
77 See Charles M. Cameron & B. Peter Rosendorff, A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight, 5 
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 44, 44 (1993) (“Hearings signal the resoluteness of the committee—the 
likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to overrule the agency.”). 
78 Committees also possess means to sanction agencies unilaterally. For instance, a committee may 
decline to report an agency-favored bill or, for Senate committees, a nomination to the floor. While 
the parent chamber may override these decisions by discharging the bill or nomination, the chamber 
incurs costs in doing so. These unilateral sanctions are beyond the scope of this Article and remain a 
promising avenue for future research. 
79 See Beermann, supra note 11, at 125; Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and 
Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1078 (2001). 
80 See FOREMAN, supra note 21, at 35 (“[T]he most common impact of congressional scrutiny is to 
raise a given issue, whether significant or trivial, as a priority.”). 
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publicized hearings. Rather, committee-based oversight derives its potency from the 
cue it provides to Congress. 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic sequence of agency and committee actions 
relevant to a decision to conduct oversight. First, the committee, when faced with an 
agency infraction, must decide whether or not to hold a hearing. Second, if a hearing 
is held, the agency must decide whether to comply with or flout the committee’s 
wishes following the hearing. Finally, if the agency decides not to comply, the 
committee must decide whether to alert Congress to the agency’s intransigence. 
Figure 1: 
Committee & Agency Actions during the Oversight Process 
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To provide a bit more detail, when presented with evidence of bureaucratic 
wrongdoing, the committee is faced with a simple decision at the first node: hold 
hearings or ignore the infraction. When making this initial decision, the committee 
considers potential outcomes further down the game tree. If the committee chooses 
to ignore the infraction, the game ends, with the status quo preserved. If the 
committee holds a hearing, then the targeted agency is the next player to move. 
Following the hearing, the agency may either comply with the committee’s demands 
or ignore them. 
If the agency ignores the committee’s demands, then the committee is faced 
with a second choice. The first option is to punish the agency. There are several 
forms of sanctions, all of which involve Congress’s exercise of its “hard powers.”81 
For instance, Congress can narrow the scope of the agency’s mission; provide a more 
detailed mandate to constrain the agency’s discretion; or, in the Senate, delay or 
refuse to report out a nominee to the agency. All of these sanctions typically 
originate with a first step taken by the House or Senate authorization committee with 
oversight jurisdiction over the agency. (For ease of reference, throughout this Article 
I refer to all of these measures—even those involving budgetary measures and 
appointments—as “legislative sanctions.”) 
Alternatively, the committee, when faced with an intransigent agency, may 
yield. If from the committee’s perspective the potential legislative sanctions imposed 
by Congress would be worse than other options, the committee may choose not to 
act. Put more plainly, the agency calls the committee’s bluff. 
Notice that, when deciding whether to hold a hearing, the committee must 
take into account the likely responses of both the agency and Congress. Accordingly, 
preference divergence between Congress and particular committees leads 
committees to behave strategically in deciding which agencies (among those 
agencies within the committees’ jurisdictions) to oversee.82 When deciding whether 
to hold an oversight hearing, a committee must weigh the potential gains from 
curbing agency misbehavior against the possibility that a hearing, by highlighting a 
neglected corner of the executive branch, will awaken Congress to enact policy 
changes that the committee opposes.  
                                                     
81 For a typology of Congress’s hard and soft powers, see CHAFETZ, supra note 12, at 3. 
82 Jurisdictional boundaries, though often not precisely fixed, constrain these strategic decisions. See 
generally DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM JURISDICTION 
(1997). 
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Similarly, preference divergence between the committee and agency makes 
oversight less likely, all else equal. To see why, note that committee-agency 
preference divergence increases the likelihood that the agency will ignore the 
committee’s demands, thus leaving the committee with the choice between 
acquiescing or alerting the larger legislature—which could lead to committee-
disfavored legislative action. Because the committee may prefer the status quo to 
either of these outcomes, the committee is less likely to engage in oversight in the 
first instance when the committee and agency hold divergent preferences. 
Thus, the insight that committees conduct oversight hearings, which get their 
bite from the threat of Congress-imposed sanctions for continued agency non-
compliance, has implications concerning when oversight will occur. Specifically, the 
need for committees, when deciding whether to hold hearings, to anticipate both the 
agency’s and Congress’s likely response to potential hearings, limits the set of issues 
on which committees decide to hold hearings. 
To be clear, this Article does not claim that committees engage in oversight 
exclusively to influence agencies. Legislators may convene hearings to raise their 
profiles with voters, donors, their colleagues, or others. Whether hearings also alter 
agency behavior sometimes may be secondary, or even orthogonal, to these 
objectives. Neither do agencies view hearings solely as a means to signal potential 
legislative changes should the agency not bend to the committee. For instance, 
agency officials may fear public admonishment in future hearings, and therefore 
accommodate a committee to avoid future embarassment, irrespective of any 
potential for legislative sanctions. The Article does assume, however, that the 
prospect of influencing agencies is often in the mix when committees hold hearings; 
in other words, that legislators to some extent care about influencing policy and that 
a substantial source of their ability to exert influence is grounded in their legislative 
power. 
Hypotheses 
The above theory leads to three testable hypotheses. The following notion 
motivates all three hypotheses: When deciding whether to hold hearings, committees 
will look down the game tree to weigh the expected result of hearings given the 
relevant actors’ likely behavior at each subsequent node against the expected result if 
the committee declines to hold hearings. This logic—essentially, a rudimentary 
model of coercive bargaining—generates the following three hypotheses. 
First, the distance between the political preferences of an agency and those of 
Congress may impact committee oversight activity. When an agency and Congress 
are largely in agreement, the supposed “threat” of legislation is less formidable, 
giving agencies less of an incentive to conform to committee objectives following 
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oversight hearings. Aware of this heightened risk of non-compliance, committees 
may have less of an incentive to hold hearings under these circumstances. 
Conversely, agencies with preferences that are far from those of Congress may be 
more likely to be overseen. This rationale leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
 Hypothesis 1: As agency and congressional preferences diverge, 
committee-based oversight tends to increase. 
Second, differences between the agency and committee may affect oversight 
levels. Here, the presence of a bifurcated congressional principal leads to an 
unintuitive prediction. Common sense suggests that a committee is more likely to 
oversee an agency with preferences that are at odds with the agency’s views. But the 
theory presented above points to a different result. Consider that, as agency and 
committee preferences converge, the agency may find compliance with committee 
demands to be less onerous. Thus, when faced with a decision to either comply with 
committee demands following a hearing or face the possibility of legislative 
sanctions, agencies may be more likely to comply when their views are closer to 
those of the committee. Committees, aware of this tendency, may be encouraged to 
pursue oversight more vigorously.  
Given the counterintuitive nature of this prediction, I present two competing 
hypotheses; Hypothesis 2a states the “common sense” logic that agencies with 
divergent preferences from those of the relevant committees will receive more 
oversight attention, while Hypothesis 2b presents the converse, which is grounded in 
the theory presented supra. 
 
 Hypothesis 2a: As agency and committee preferences diverge, 
committee-based oversight tends to increase. 
 
 Hypothesis 2b: As agency and committee preferences converge, 
committee-based oversight tends to increase. 
 
At first blush, Hypothesis 2b may seem surprising. Why would a committee 
be more likely to call attention to infractions committed by friendly agencies? Recall 
that as agency and committee preferences diverge, the prospect of complying with 
the committee following a hearing becomes less appealing to the agency—and, thus, 
the agency is more willing to risk legislative sanctions, ceteris paribus. Looking 
down the decision tree, the committee recognizes that oversight hearings are less 
likely to yield agency compliance where agency and committee preferences diverge. 
Congress in the Administrative State 
 
21 
 
Accordingly, the committee is less interested in holding oversight hearings in the 
first instance.  The basic rationale—which is familiar in the international relations 
literature on economic sanctions—is that coercion is more likely to be effective 
when the coercing actor and its target already have relatively close preferences, 
because the target can more easily meet the sender’s demand in this circumstance; 
thus, coercion is more likely to occur in the first instance.83 
Third, I hypothetize that preference convergence between committee and 
Congress is associated with increased oversight. Consider that as a hypothetical 
sanctioning bill moves from committee markup to floor vote, the signal that the 
originating committee had intended to send may be distorted; this distortion is 
especially likely where the committee and chamber are at loggerheads.84 The 
possibility that the enacted version of a sanctioning bill may deviate significantly 
from committee intentions suggests that oversight may not occur when committee 
and Congress hold markedly different preferences.85 Under these circumstances, the 
sanctions threat that is necessary for oversight to have an effect may not be 
plausible.86  
Essentially, if the committee and legislature have opposing views, the 
committee cannot credibly commit to introduce sanctioning legislation should the 
agency not comply following a hearing, since this legislation could be altered during 
post-markup stages, leading to a final product that is far removed from committee 
objectives. Alternatively, the committee could worry that a hearing would alert 
Congress to take up legislation in a previously unperturbed policy area, inadvertently 
providing a cue to Congress, which, again, could lead to a legislative product far 
from committee preferences. Aware of these potential outcomes, the committee may 
neglect its oversight function when it and Congress hold disparate preferences, i.e., 
when the committee weakly prefers the status quo to Congress’s position in the 
relevant issue area. By contrast, committees with political preferences that are 
aligned with those of Congress may have greater incentive to pursue oversight.  
                                                     
83 See Daniel Drezner, Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion, 42 INT’L STUD. 
Q. 709 (1998). 
84 See Terry Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of “Congressional Dominance”, 12 LEGIS. 
STUD. Q. 475, 488 (1987) (stating that, at the final passage stage, bills “may bear very little 
resemblance to what the subcommittee originally threatened to produce”). 
85 See Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, 
Oversight, and the Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 102-08 (1997) (noting that this 
divergence is not an uncommon occurrence, due to the greater relative influence of organized interests 
in committee). 
86 See Moe, An Assessment, supra note 84, at 488 (“[T]he long-run prospect of a substantially 
moderated, compromise bill is likely to carry little inducement value as a control mechanism.”). 
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 Hypothesis 3: As committee and congressional preferences converge, 
oversight tends to increase. 
 
B. Research Design 
Unit of Analysis: Agency Infractions Data 
To examine when a committee will decide to take up an agency action as the 
subject of an oversight hearing, it is not sufficient simply to examine the 
characteristics of agency actions that receive oversight attention; instead, one must 
determine the pool of agency actions that potentially could lead to hearings—some 
of which capture Congress’s attention whereas others do not—and probe the relevant 
differences between the two groups that led Congress to focus its attention on the 
former set of agency actions but not the latter. 
Accordingly, I construct an original dataset of agency infractions, defined as 
any perceived agency action during the 1991-2012 period that potentially could 
result in a hearing.87 I derive these data from inspectors general (IG) semiannual 
reports, Government Accountibility Office (GAO) annual “top management 
challenges” lists, and New York Times and Wall Street Journal editorials. For each 
action, I employ a mix of hand-coding by a research assistant and automatic text 
analysis techniques88 to identify both the relevant agency and the subject matter of 
                                                     
87 This period covers Congresses with a variety of partisan alignments and changes in presidential and 
congressional leadership, thereby militating against the possibility of party-alignment- or 
officeholder-driven results for the analysis to follow. Democrats and Republicans each held the 
presidency and majorities in both chambers for approximately four years during this period. 
(Republicans controlled all three entities for additional seven non-consecutive months in 2001-2002 
due to several unusual events in a closely divided Senate.) Of the eight possible permutations of 
Democratic or Republican control of the White House, Senate, and House, six occurred during this 
period. 
88 For the IG reports, I first ran a Perl script to extract text from PDF versions of each report. I then 
ran a script to identify, within each report, text that is suggestive of an infraction. This script identified 
text containing the agency name and, in close proximity, one of the subject areas listed in note 89, and 
automatically assigned an agency code and a subject-matter code to each infraction. A research 
assistant then reviewed these automated assignments. For the newspaper editorials, a research 
assistant and I searched the New York Times and Wall Street Journal online archives for mentions of 
each agency on each newspaper’s editorial page. One of us then read each editorial that mentioned an 
agency to determine, first, whether the editorial criticized the agency and, if so, how to hand-code the 
editorial concerning the agency code and subject-matter code. For the annual GAO Top Management 
Challenges lists, I hand-coded each item on each list.  
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the infraction, from a list of 42 subjects.89 
These four sources capture a broad range of issues that plausibly could lead 
to hearings. Inspector-general reports cover the widest range of subjects. GAO 
management-challenges lists, which are separate from the reports that the agency 
publishes at Congress’s direction, focus on information-technology, procurement, 
and human resources. The newspaper editorials tend to discuss agencies that are 
allegedly too harsh or too lenient with regulated groups or client groups, as well as 
critiques of appointees’ alleged misconduct or incompetence. Figure 2 provides an 
overview of the distribution of these 14,431 across the four sources. 
                                                     
89 These subject areas are: (1) financial management / qualified audit; (2) Government Performance & 
Results Act implementation; (3) program evaluation; (4) information-resource management; (5) 
information-technology issues, e.g., Clinger-Cohen Act implementation, the y2k bug, and IT 
procurement; (6) Paperwork Reduction Act implementation; (7) Freedom of Information Act 
implementation and related issues concerning secrecy; (8) intergovernmental relations; (9) facilities, 
public-land, and construction management; (10) public land management; (11) procurement, 
acquisitions, and non-construction contractor management; (12) rule or proposed rule with no 
statutory basis; (13) grants to state or local governments; (14) grants to foreign governments; (15) 
grants for domestic spending to individuals, universities, and NGOs; (16) foreign-aid grants or other 
grants for foreign spending to individuals, universities, NGOs, foreign governments, and transnational 
bodies; (17) other grant management issues; agency is (18) insufficiently or (19) overly attentive to 
client group; (20) agency unable to prevent client group misbehavior; agency is (21) too harsh or (22) 
too lenient to regulated group; (23) agency unable to prevent regulated group misbehavior; (24) 
agency tolerates discrimination against its employees; agency tolerates discrimination against 
contractors, clients, regulated groups, or others; (25) violence or threatened violence by agency 
personnel; (26) safeguarding privacy or trade secrets; (27) other civil rights or civil liberties 
violations; (28) recruiting qualified civil servants; (29) training civil servants; (30) incompetent civil 
servants; (31) politically motivated civil servants; (32) bribery of civil servants; (33) fraud, theft of 
government property, or improper billing by civil servants; (34) other misconduct by civil servants; 
(35) incompetent or unqualified appointee; appointee unwilling to implement (36) congressional, (37) 
presidential or secretarial, or (38) judicial directive; (39) attorney general unwilling to appoint special 
prosecutor; (40) fraud, theft of government property, or improper billing by appointee; (41) conflict of 
interest, or appearance thereof, caused by appointee’s ties; and (42) other misconduct by appointee. 
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Figure 2: Sources of Agency Infractions Data 
 
At first glance, compiling data on possible topics for oversight may appear to 
be an exercise in futility. After all, on one level any criticism—no matter which 
person or entity gives voice to it—about any aspect of the executive branch can be 
considered a potential oversight topic. On the other side, using overly narrow criteria 
for determining which critiques have a “reasonable” chance of being covered in 
hearings may raise endogeneity concerns. 
There are three reasons why this project avoids these pitfalls. First, the four 
included sources capture the overwhelming majority—over 90%—of topics that 
actually appear on Congress’s oversight agenda. The fact that the vast majority of 
hearings can be traced to a specific infraction in the dataset provides compelling 
support for the measure’s content validity. Second, legislator and staff surveys 
suggest that overseers actually rely on these four sources when setting their oversight 
agendas.90 Third, for those infractions identified in IG reports, which account for 
11,970 of the 14,431 infractions in the dataset, endogeneity concerns—specifically, 
the possibility of congressional influence in the subjects chosen—are not present, 
since these offices are considered removed from congressional influence.91 
I do not claim that legislators consult these particular four sources in 
selecting potential topics. Rather, these four sources do a remarkably good job of 
mirroring the content of the unknown sources—media, government offices, 
                                                     
90 See ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 89. 
91 See PAUL LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR 
ACCOUNTABILITY 3-24 (1993). 
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colleagues, supporters, etc.—that actually influence legislators’ oversight decisions. 
Taken together, these four sources encompass the range of administrative issues that 
tend to attract Congress’s attention.92 
Neither do I suggest that legislators, in selecting topics for hearings, are 
motivated primarily by an intention to actually “correct” agency behavior. Instead, 
this Part expressly assumes that congressional oversight is politically motivated. But 
recognition of the politicized nature of oversight does not imply that the subjects of 
hearings are made up out of whole cloth. Rather, there almost always is some actual 
“misbehavior” that grounds congressional oversight. While that real-world agency 
action may be mere pretense, misrepresented or exaggerated for oversight-as-
political theater, it is typically still present. Further, for those hearings topics that 
arguably are manufactured, the New York Times and Wall Street Journal editorial 
pages may capture many of these subjects. In fact, of the 5,202 unique oversight 
hearings that House committees and subcommittees held between 1991 and 2012, 
the subjects of 4,801 were cited in at least one of the four sources during the 
preceding 12 months—a 7.7% omission rate. While I do not take a position 
regarding the actual sources that politically motivated legislators use to select 
subjects for hearings, this low incorrect classification rate indicates that, regardless 
of the actual process by which oversight topics are generated, these four sources 
generally are reflective of the actual pool of potential hearings. 
Employing individual infractions as the unit of analysis represents an 
improvement over past work on oversight, which relies on each hearing as the unit of 
analysis.93 Including each infraction—regardless of whether it results in a hearing—
as an observation in this dataset allows for variation in the dependent value. Since 
virtually all oversight hearings can be traced to a specific motivating agency action 
                                                     
92 The IG and GAO reports emphasize apolitical valence issues, e.g., procurement management, 
employee retention, etc., while the two newpaper editorial pages often voice ideologically-driven 
critiques. In addition, while all four sources address program implementation issues, GAO reports on 
program implementation tend to cut across agencies, e.g., the executive branch is slow to implement 
statutory provisions related to information technology. Also note that, unlike with most GAO reports, 
which are compiled at legislators’ request, these “top management challenges” lists are compiled on 
GAO’s own initiative. Moreover, although both the IG reports and the newspaper editorials frequently 
feature corruption allegations, the Times and Journal tend to focus on behavior by senior appointees, 
while the IGs deal with civil servants and, occasionally, lower-level appointees. Approximately 80% 
of the infractions included in these data are derived from the IG reports, 9% from each of the 
newspapers, and the remaining 2% from the GAO lists. 
93 See, e.g., David C.W. Parker & Matthew M. Dull, Divided We Quarrel: The Politics of 
Congressional Investigations, 1947-2004, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 319 (2009); DAVID R. MAYHEW, 
DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-1990 (1991); 
ABERBACH, supra note 20; MORRIS S. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY (1976). 
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or event, an analysis of oversight activity that does not consider the population of 
possible oversight hearings is essentially omitting the most proximate and arguably 
the most likely cause for a given topic to be placed on the oversight agenda.94  
It is important to acknowledge that considerable variation among 
infractions—each of which has unique characteristics—is stripped away in the 
course of placing each infraction into one of the 42 subject-matter categories listed in 
Footnote 89. To be sure, similar loss of detail occurs in many instances when 
qualitative information is standardized as data;95 with the creation of a new dataset in 
this Article, the reader sees how the sausage is made.  
From the other direction, one also could say that the data are insufficiently 
standardized.  For instance, the charge that the Mine Safety & Health Administration 
is insufficiently attentive to investigating fatal accidents (subject-matter category 22) 
is obviously qualitatively different from an allegation of waste, fraud, or abuse in 
National Parks Service construction projects (category 9). Most significantly, the 
former charge has a political dimension, as the appropriate level of regulation is a 
subject of political contestation, whereas the latter charge has lower political 
salience. Further, the line between political and non-political “good government” 
issues is often blurry. For instance, conservatives generally may care more about 
Type I errors by agencies (e.g., a computer glitch that leads to the approval of 
applicants that do not meet the standards for the Social Security disability program) 
and liberals more about Type II errors (such as a glitch with the opposite effect). 
To address this critique, I run the analyses to follow twice: once for all 42 
categories of infractions and again for the subset of infractions with the clearest 
connection to partisan contestation. This subset includes agency rulemakings 
(category 12 in Footnote 89); grant decisions (13-17); solicitousness towards client 
groups (18-20); solicitousness towards regulated groups (21-23); appointee 
competence or responsiveness (35-39); and criminal or unethical behavior by an 
appointee (40-42). The results of this second set of analyses are reported throughout 
Parts II and III. 
                                                     
94 Moreover, a study seeking to determine what factors explain the occurrence of oversight hearings 
that only examines those instances where oversight hearings occur is selecting on the dependent 
variable, leading to potentially biased estimates.  
95 See, e.g., ADAM J. BERINSKY, SILENT VOICES: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN 
AMERICA (2006) (investigating the views of survey respondents who say they “don’t know” in 
response to a survey question); Stephen R.G. Jones & W. Craig Riddell, The Measurement of 
Unemployment: An Empirical Approach, 67 ECONOMETRICA 147 (1999) (discussing shortcomings in 
the collection and interpretation of unemployment statistics). 
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Dependent Variable: Oversight Hearings Data 
For each infraction, I determine whether an oversight hearing was held in the 
12 months following the first mention of the infraction. I define “oversight” broadly, 
as inquiries into agency practices in which the agency undertakes autonomous action 
or otherwise exercises discretion in a manner of which members of Congress may 
disapprove. Common subjects of oversight hearings include agency-generated rules 
and proposed rules; adjudicatory decisions; allegations of waste, fraud, or abuse; 
non-statutorily mandated features of the executive branch’s structure; and many 
procurement and personnel practices. To collect these data, I start with a dataset of 
all hearings held during the relevant period from the Comparative Agendas Project 
(CAP) database, a comprehensive online database of congressional activity, among 
other topics.96 After excluding non-oversight-related hearings,97 a research assistant 
or I read the short descriptions of each hearing in the CAP database and classify each 
hearing by the target agency and subject matter, using the same agency and subject-
matter codes as for the infractions data.98 With this procedure, I determine that 
Congress held 5,202 oversight hearings between 1991 and 2012. 
Independent Variables: Congressional, Committee, and Agency Preferences  
Converting the hypotheses in Part II.A into testable variables involves 
identifying preference estimates for Congress, its committees and subcommittees, 
and executive agencies.  
To determine congressional and subcommittee preferences, I start with the 
DW-NOMINATE dataset, which contains estimates on a unidimensional scale of 
each legislator’s ideological position based on that legislator’s roll call voting 
record.99 I measure congressional preferences using preference estimate for the 
                                                     
96 FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN JONES, Congressional Hearings, COMPARATIVE AGENDAS 
PROJECT: U.S. POLICY AGENDAS, available at www.comparativeagendas.net./us.  
97 I excluded all hearings that (i) CAP coded as an appropriations hearing, markup, or bill referral; (ii) 
the hearings description, as included in the CAP dataset, included the phased “as required by”; (iii) 
the hearing title or description indicated that the primary purpose of the hearing was to consider new 
legislation; or (iv) the hearing title explicitly praised the subject agency. 
98 Where the short description did not provide sufficient information, we accessed the Congressional 
Information Service database to examine hearing testimony and other primary source information to 
determine which agency was the principal subject of each hearing.  
99 See Royce Carroll, Jeff Lewis, James Lo, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, & Howard Rosenthal, 
“DW-NOMINATE Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors,” available at 
http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp. See also KEITH POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A 
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997). All calculations utilize first dimension 
Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores. 
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median House majority party member.100 
To measure subcommittee preferences, I then identify the subcommittee with 
the most legitimate jurisdictional claim over each infraction.101 I use the preference 
estimate for the subcommittee chair as a proxy for the subcommittee’s preferences, 
which is proper because most subcommittees formally authorize only the chair to 
call a hearing.102 
To ascertain agency preferences, I employ Chen-Johnson scores.103 These 
authors use bureaucrats’ campaign contributions to elected officials to estimate 
agencies’ ideological views. They then imput the roll-call-based preference estimate 
for the elected official back to the donor, using a weighted average to determine the 
preferences of individuals that donate to multiple politicians.104 
                                                     
100 A set of alternative specifications uses the median House member as an alternative proxy for 
chamber preferences. The results using this measure were substantially similar to those reported in the 
main model. 
101 The decision to hold hearings can properly be considered to rest with the subcommittee. For 
Democratic-controlled Congresses during this period, the subcommittee bill of rights granted to 
subcommittees powers that are relevant to a decision to hold hearings. See Richard Hall & Lawrence 
Evans, The Power of Subcommittees, 52 J. POL. 335 (1990). During periods of Republican rule, when 
the formal powers previously assigned to subcommittees were rolled back, subcommittees still 
retained their authority in many oversight-related areas, through norms and other informal 
mechanisms. See John Baughman, The Role of Subcommittees After the Republican Revolution, 34 
AM. POL. RES. 243 (2006). Because the House and Senate rules do not delineate subcommittees’ 
jurisdictions, these determinations necessarily were, in essence, judgment calls. For each infraction, I 
identify the relevant subcommittee for each infraction by examining subcommittee names and, where 
possible, descriptions of the subcommittee turf on the subcommittee’s website.  
102 KAISER, ET AL., supra note 24, at 69. As an alternative specification for subcommittee preferences, 
I also used preference estimates for that group’s median majority party member. As discussed in Part 
I.C, many subcommittees by convention permit a subset of subcommittee members—typically a 
majority of the majority-party members—to call a hearing. Id. The minority party, by contrast, 
essentially plays no role in the scheduling of oversight hearings. See MARTIN JAMES, CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT 48 (2002). In light of the role that a majority of the majority party plays, this median 
provides a second way to operationalization subcommittee preferences. The results in Parts II and III 
using this alternative specification are substantially similar. 
103 Jowei Chen & Tim Johnson, Federal Unionization and Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy: 
Estimating and Explaining Ideological Change in Executive Agencies, 27 J. THEORETICAL POL. 151 
(2015), dataset available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jowei/AgencyIdeology/.  
104 A set of alternative specifications uses agency-ideology scores derived from a survey of prominent 
administrative scholars and journalists, polling each respondent on his or her opinion of various 
agencies’ ideological outlooks. See Joshua Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency 
Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 11 (2008). The results using this 
measure of agency ideology were substantially similar to those reported in the main model. 
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Finally, to construct Agency-Chamber Divergence, I normalize the Chen-
Johnson and DW-NOMINATE scores for, respectively, agencies and the House and 
Senate, on a zero to one scale. I then calculate the absolute value of the distance 
between these two scores for each agency-chamber dyad. I employ a similar 
procedure to create Agency-Comm. Convergence and Comm.-Chamber 
Convergence.105 
C. Results 
With a pool of 14,431 agency infractions as the unit of analysis, 5,202 
oversight hearings as the dependent variable, and political preference estimates for 
Congress, its committees, and all executive and most independent agencies as 
independent variables, I run a series of logistic regression models to test the 
hypotheses listed in Part II.A. To provide a substantive interpretation of the 
coefficient estimates, I then simulate first differences.  
Table 1 reports the results of these models. The first column shows the 
theorized directions of the relevant coefficients, based on the hypotheses developed 
above. Model 1 reports the results of a series of bivariate models using all infractions 
as observations. Model 2 reports the results of a multivariate model using these same 
data. Models 3 and 4 report these results only for infractions in the most politically 
salient categories.106 For all models, the coefficient estimates show the association 
between features of the congressional-committee-agency environment and the 
likelihood of a committee convening at least one oversight hearing concerning that 
infraction. 
                                                     
105 Because these quantities are easier to interpret if as becoming larger as the relevant actors’ 
preferences converge rather than diverge, Agency-Comm. Convergence and Comm.-Chamber 
Convergence use the inverses of the absolute values of the distances between, respectively, agency 
and committee and committee and chamber. 
106 Recall from Part II.B that these most politically salient infractions are: agency rulemakings 
(category 12 in Footnote 89); grant decisions (categories 13-17); solicitousness towards client groups 
(18-20); solicitousness towards regulated groups (21-23); appointee competence or responsiveness 
(35-39); and criminal or unethical behavior by an appointee (40-42). 
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Table 1: Regression Results 
  All Infractions High Salience Infractions 
 
 Theory 
Predicts: 
Model 1 
(Bivariate 
Models) 
 
Model 2 
(Multivar. 
Model) 
Model 3 
(Bivar. 
Models) 
Model 4 
(Multivar. 
Model) 
 
Agency-Chamber 
Preference Divergence 
 
+ 
(H.1) 
 
2.047** 
(0.659) 
 
1.831* 
(0.834) 
 
2.094** 
(0.740) 
 
1.443 
(0.966) 
 
Agency-Comm. 
Convergence 
 
- (H.2a) 
+ (H.2b) 
 
0.804 
(0.885) 
 
1.512* 
(0.632) 
 
0.304 
(0.745) 
 
1.704 
(1.013) 
 
Comm.-Chamber 
Convergence 
 
 
+ 
(H.3) 
 
66.479*** 
(18.420) 
 
53.835** 
(20.005) 
 
58.337* 
(24.826) 
 
64.936* 
(29.402) 
Congress Fixed Effects 
 
 N Y N Y 
observations  14,431 14,431 2,070 2,070 
Cells report coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, standard errors clustered by committee. Unit of analysis: 
agency infractions. Dependent variable: whether at least one hearing was held concerning the infraction in the 
12 months following the infraction’s mention. Models 1 and 3 include fixed effects for each Congress between 
the 103rd and 112th (baseline category: 102nd Congress). *** signifies p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
Models estimated via logistic regression. 
 
The hypotheses related to Agency-Chamber Divergence and Comm.-
Chamber Convergence generally find support in Table 1. All of the associated 
coefficient estimates are positively signed and, with the exception of Agency-
Chamber Divergence in Model 4, statistically significant. The story is more mixed 
for Agency-Comm. Convergence. While the coefficient estimates are positive in all 
four models, they only reach conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance 
in Model 2, which is the full, multivariate model. In Models 1 and 3, the associated 
standard errors dwarf the coefficient estimates. 
The substantive interpretation of the these estimates is not intuitive. Figure 3 
reports the expected change in the likelihood of a committee convening at least one 
oversight hearing concerning an infraction when each covariate, in turn, shifts from 
its 25th percentile value to its 75th percentile value. For instance, the value for the 
Committee-Chamber Convergence variable indicates that oversight hearings are 
10.6% more likely to occur in expectation when Committee-Chamber Convergence 
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is at its 75th percentile value—i.e., when the preferences of the relevant committee 
and its parent chamber are closer together than is the case for 75% of the 
observations in the dataset—than when this variable is at its 25th percentile value. 
These simulated first differences are generated from the Model 2, the full 
model. Analyses grounded in the other models yield similar results for Agency-
Chamber Divergence and Comm.-Chamber Convergence and null results for 
Agency-Comm. Convergence. 
Figure 3: First Differences in the Expected Likelihood of Oversight 
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n = 14,431. Figure reports simulated first differences in the expected likelihood of a committee 
convening at least one oversight hearing concerning an infraction, when one shifts each explanatory 
variable, in turn, from its 25th to its 75th percentile value. Bars signify 95% confidence interval. 
Quantities of interest estimated by running 1000 simulations in Zelig using a logistic regression 
model. See Christine Choirat, James Honaker, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Olivia Lau. Zelig: 
Everyone's Statistical Software (2015 ed.), available on-line at www.zeligproject.org (last accessed 
Jan 24, 2017). Unit of analysis: agency infractions. Dependent variable: whether at least one 
hearing was held concerning the infraction in the 12 months following the infraction’s mention. 
 
These results show that political differences among the various actors—
agencies, committees, and Congress—substantively affect which problems within 
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administrative agencies become topics for oversight hearings.107 The reason why 
committees must take other actors’ preferences into account when deciding whether 
to conduct oversight is rooted in what this Article terms the oversight dilemma: the 
impact of hearings requires the potential for sanctions following an agency’s non-
compliance with committee objectives expressed in a hearing, but committees do not 
possess any independent authority to impose these measures. Since oversight 
involves a bifurcated principal, it is consequential only to the extent that an implied 
threat of congressional sanctions following non-compliance with committee 
objectives is credible. As a result, committees limit their oversight activity based on 
factors in the larger political environment—but, when committee oversight does 
occur, it is aligned with the more democratically representative preferences of the 
overall Congress.  
III. IMPACT 
Determining whether oversight alters agency behavior or is merely 
reelection-oriented posturing is essential to assessing whether oversight can serve as 
an ex post check on delegated powers. Given Congress’s broad delegations of ex 
ante policymaking authority to the executive branch;108 the relative weakness or 
underuse of other ex post means of influence;109 and the judiciary’s broad 
endorsement of the transfer of policymaking authority to the executive branch;110 a 
firm understanding of the consequences of ex post oversight is crucial to assessing 
the extent to which Congress exercises control over the administrative state. 
                                                     
107 I also run similar simulated first differences for the 2,070 infractions in the most politically salient 
categories. See supra Part II.B (listing these most politically salient infractions). The resulting 
coefficient estimates are all properly signed and larger than the associated clustered standard errors, 
although only Comm-Chamber Convergence achieves conventionally accepted levels of statistical 
significance. These results may be attributable to the substantially smaller sample size in this model.  
108 See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 434-39 (1999). 
109 See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727, 
731 (2009) [hereinafter Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress].  
110 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (noting that only a bare-bones 
“intelligible principle,” such as that the regulation is in the “public interest,” is needed to satisfy the 
nondelegation doctrine). The Court also grants agencies wide latitude in interpreting their organic 
statutes and self-promulgated regulations, and in determining the appropriate administrative 
procedures to govern their decision-making. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 19, 524 (1978). . Relatedly, courts exhibit an overall 
disinclination to interfere where Congress has not unambiguously expressed its intent via ex ante 
lawmaking. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981); 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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The notion that oversight affords Congress some degree of control over 
administration is in tension with the conventional wisdom. The dominant perspective 
among legal scholars regarding the relative abilities of the political branches to 
control the administrative state considers Congress in decline and the White House 
ascendant.111 This perspective holds that, at least since the New Deal era, Congress 
has demonstrated a willingness to cede policymaking power to the executive branch 
via the enactment of broadly-written and, in some cases, deliberately vague statutes 
that place few limits on administrative agencies.112 The judiciary mostly has assented 
to this transfer of policymaking authority,113 with the Supreme Court upholding 
every statute challenged on nondelegation grounds that it has considered since 
1935.114 Further, the design of administrative procedures has proven inadequate as an 
alternative means of congressional control. Although administrative procedures—in 
theory—could be designed to faciliate popular or interest group influence in the 
adminstrative state, thereby obviating the need for continued, direct congressional 
involvement,115 Congress does devote much attention to this role.116  
 The received wisdom among legal scholars also focuses on the White 
House’s development of a set of tools to enhance presidential control of 
administration—a development that occurred concurrent to the decline in Congress’s 
                                                     
111 See supra note 14 (providing citations). 
112 See Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules, supra note 108. 
113 See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. at 474 (requiring only that Congress provide an “intelligible 
principle” to guide executive branch policymakers). 
114 See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1012 (2015). 
115 See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, & Barry Weingast, Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast, 
Procedures as Instruments]; accord Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-
404, 6o Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 555-557, 706 (requiring a notice 
and comment period before most agency rulemakings, mandating trial-like features in certain agency 
adjudications, and requiring that substantial evidence support agency adjudicatory findings).  
116 See Glen O. Robinson, Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies: 
Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV. 483, 488 (1989) (noting that an overview of a 
variety of agencies’ organic statutes “reveals no relevant specification of internal structure”); id. at 
488-89 (arguing that this inter-agency procedural uniformity suggests that Congress does not vary 
administrative procedures for the purpose of promoting agency responsiveness to favored groups, 
which calls into question the notion that the APA enables a form of indirect congressional influence in 
administration). Perhaps as a result, the formal ability of outside actors to challenge administrative 
proceedings or outcomes is limited. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (the challenger bears 
the burden of demonstrating actual bias in proceedings in which the same agency serves as 
investigator and adjudicator); Envirocare of Utah v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Chevron 
deference permits agencies to exclude certain parties from adjudications). 
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exercise of its lawmaking authority.117 Most notably, the use of executive orders to 
set administrative policy has become increasingly common since the New Deal 
era.118 The establishment of the White House Office of Management & Budget in the 
1970s,119 and the expanded role that its Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs 
subunit has played since the 1980s and 1990s, rejecting proposed regulations that 
failed its cost-benefit analyses, further bolstered presidential control of 
administration.120 More recently, the increased use of presidential signing statements 
as post-passage instruments of White House policy also augments presidential 
power.121 Mostly unchallenged by the courts,122 these mechanisms reinforce the 
perception that the President occupies the central position in the administrative 
state.123 By contrast, many of the functional innovations proposed by Congress to 
buttress its role in administration have been struck down on formalist, separation-of-
powers grounds.124 
On the surface, trends in the use of these three formal control mechanisms—
i.e., Congress’s reduced role in lawmaking and concomitant delegation of 
policymaking authority to administrative agencies; its inability to design 
administrative procedures as an alternative means of indirect control; and the White 
                                                     
117 See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Contemporary Assault on Checks and Balances, 7 WIDENER J. 
PUB. L. 231, 241-55 (1998). 
118 See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 132, 133 (1999). 
119 Although OMB’s origins are in the 1920s Bureau of the Budget, the office’s reorganization in the 
1970s significantly expanded its powers and strengthened its ties to the White House. See Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2275-76 (2001). 
120 See id. at 2277-81, 2285-90. 
121 See Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
123 (1994). 
122 But see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (holding the presidential line item veto 
unconstitutional).  
123 See generally Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1728 (1996). 
124 See Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 
(1991) (blocking legislators from serving on an administrative board); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714 (1986) (striking down a statute that placed some budgetary authority in the hands of an executive 
official removable only by Congress); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (disallowing the one-
chamber legislative veto). United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (holding the two-
chamber veto unconstitutional); Process Gas Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 
(1983) (striking down a one-chamber veto of administrative rules); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (preventing congressional leaders from unilaterally selecting members of an independent 
agency). 
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House’s establishment of new mechanisms to enhance its involvement in 
administration—suggest that Congress is a branch in decline.125 Yet emphasis on 
these formal, directly coercive mechanisms neglects other potential means of 
congressional influence.126 Consider that Congress began to pursue its oversight 
function with renewed vigor during roughly the same period as its relative role in 
policymaking declined. For instance, Congress passed its arguably two most 
consequential oversight-related bills—the APA and the Legislative Reorganization 
Act (LRA)—in 1946,127 directly following a period of massive presidential 
aggrandizement during the New Deal and World War II.128 Equally noteworthy is the 
fact that the 1970s and 1980s saw the concurrent development of new mechanisms 
for presidential control of administration and increased congressional attention to 
oversight.129 Perhaps Congress’s heightened attention to oversight constitutes an 
attempt to reassert control over powers that had shifted to the executive branch.130 
A. Theory 
I claim that, in an era of greater executive involvement in administration, 
Congress uses oversight hearings to retain some degree of control over delegated 
powers. Political scientists have long debated whether Congress-agency relationships 
are characterized by congressional abdication or congressional dominance. Grounded 
in capture theory, the abdication perspective holds that because committees, 
agencies, and interest groups tend to have close ties, the prospects for vigorous 
committee oversight of agencies are slim.131 That reelection-focused legislators 
                                                     
125 See SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W. PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING: INFORMATION, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH INSTITUTIONS 168 (2012); Ackerman, supra note 14. 
126 See Beermann, supra note 11, at 64-65; Chafetz, supra note 11, at 724. 
127 The APA provided mechanisms by which interest groups could activate “fire alarms” to alert 
Congress of disfavored administrative action. See Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 
173 (1984). The LRA established the framework for Congress’s current oversight institutions. See 
Beermann, supra note 11, at 122. 
128 See ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001). 
129 See Kagan, supra note 119, at 2277-81, 2285-90 (describing the strengthening of the White House-
directed OMB and OIRA during the 1980s); ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 34-37 (noting a marked 
increase in oversight activity during the 1970s and 1980s).  
130 Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 227, 235 (1998) (stating that greater presidential involvement, “by raising the stakes for 
other actors in the system, … may trigger an oversight arms race”). 
131 See LAWRENCE DODD & RICHARD SCHOTT, CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1979); 
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1979); 
 
Congress in the Administrative State 
 
36 
 
supposedly have little incentive to conduct the hard work of day-to-day oversight 
(beyond headline-grabbing, high-profile probes) further supports the abdication 
perspective.132 Thus, the provision of oversight constitutes a collective action 
problem, with reelection-oriented legislators being poorly incentivized for its 
production. 
A second set of scholars, by contrast, considers Congress to dominate 
agencies.133 According to congressional dominance theory, the fact that committees 
are privileged actors in the legislative process empowers them to take on recalcitrant 
agencies.134 Committee prerogatives during the budget and reauthorization processes 
enable committees to control the agencies within their jurisdictions.135 
Committees’ ability to oversee and direct agencies does not imply, however, 
that committees actually engage in oversight, much less that this oversight is 
consequential. Rather, congressional dominance theory contends that legislators 
design bureaucratic institutions to respond to their preferences, through the 
enactment of information-forcing provisions and via committees’ involvement in 
appointments.136 In effect, according to dominance theory, committees substitute ex 
ante means of control in place of ex post oversight. Rather than engaging in active, 
continual monitoring of agencies (“police patrols,” in the theory’s parlance), 
committees are mobilized to act only when an outside group, e.g., an interest group 
aligned with the committee, sounds a “fire alarm” to notify the committee that 
something is amiss.137 
                                                                                                                                                      
Seymour Scher, Conditions for Legislative Control, 25 J. POL. 526, 533-34 (1963). 
132 See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL 
ACTION (2003); Terry M. Moe, The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage, in 
MICHAEL NELSON, ED., THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 425 (2003). 
133 See Mathew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and 
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 
(1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and Process]; McNollgast, Procedures as Instruments, 
supra note 115; McCubbins and Schwartz, supra note 127. 
134 See Barry R. Weingast and Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? 
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983). See also 
KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 97 (1991) (regarding committee 
perquisites in the lawmaking process). 
135 See id. 
136 See Randall L. Calvert, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, A Theory of Political 
Control and Agency Discretion, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 588, 598, 604 (1989). 
137 McCubbins and Schwartz, supra note 127, at 165-55. 
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Abdication theory points to infrequent hearings as indicating that Congress is 
shirking; dominance theory posits that infrequent hearings are a consequence of 
well-crafted administrative procedures and interest-group monitoring that reduce the 
need for congressional involvement.138 Missing from both theories is any evidence 
regarding whether oversight hearings—when they occur—are consequential. If even 
infrequent hearings significantly impact agency behavior, that hypothetical finding 
would undercut the abdication perspective. Conversely, if hearings do not have an 
impact, that finding would weaken the dominance perspective, which implies that, 
when a fire alarm is pulled, that alarm should lead to changed agency behavior. Yet, 
despite the role that oversight plays in both theories, little is known about how 
consequential oversight activity actually is.139 
The infractions data introduced in Part II can fill this gap. If specific 
infractions are found to be less likely to recur following a hearing—relative to their 
rate of recurrence when no hearing is held—this would suggest that executive branch 
officials take oversight seriously. By contrast, a null finding would suggest that 
oversight hearings are toothless—that, while hearings may serve members’ electoral 
needs, they do not affect policy outcomes. This Part tests the hypothesis that 
oversight hearings reduce recidivism; in other words, that infractions that are the 
subject of oversight hearings are less likely to recur than are similar infractions that 
do not appear on Congress’s oversight agenda.  
Although I presume, based on Part II, that oversight derives much of its 
                                                     
138 See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 133, at 443; McNollgast, Procedures as 
Instruments, supra note 115, at 244. 
139 Although there is no shortage of claims regarding the effects of oversight, these claims in large part 
have not been tested globally, viz. beyond discrete case studies of particular agencies or issue areas. 
Political science offers few empirically-grounded insights into the impact of oversight on 
administrative outcomes, as scholars have not empirically analyzed the consequences of oversight in a 
systemic manner. Instead, scholarship on oversight can be grouped into three categories. First, 
scholars have debated the extent to which Congress and its members are motivated to conduct 
oversight. See, e.g., ABERBACH, supra note 20. Second, positive political theorists have presented 
theories of the conditions for or consequences of oversight. See, e.g., Murray Horn & Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 499 
(1989); McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 127; Moe, supra note. Third, case studies examine the 
consequences of oversight with respect to a limited number of specific agencies, congressional 
committees, or policy areas. See, e.g., Mary Olson, Agency Rulemaking, Political Influence, 
Regulation, and Industry Compliance, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 573 (1999) (studying the FDA); Jeffrey 
C. Talbert, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner, Nonlegislative Hearings and Policy Change 
in Congress, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 383 (1995) (drug abuse and three other issues); JOEL A. MINTZ, 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES (1995) (enivornmental policy); R. 
DOUGLAS ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THEORY OF INFLUENCE (1979) (military 
basing, public works projects and social services grants). 
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power from an implicit threat of legislative sanctions should the agency not comply 
with committee demands following a hearing, the analysis in this Part does not rely 
on this assumption. Perhaps the embarrassment of being publicly criticized is enough 
to motivate reputation-valuing agency officials to change. Or perhaps lower-level 
agency officials angling for a promotion alert Congress to infractions (bypassing the 
media), and when they are promoted, they implement changes; in this telling, 
oversight motivates a personnel change, and this personnel change, in turn, leads to 
new practices at the agency.  
This Part is agnostic regarding the specific causal mechanism by which 
hearings alter agency behavior. The basic notion to be tested here is less 
complicated: that oversight matters. Congress marshals substantial resources to 
perform its oversight function, from the time that legislators spend preparing for and 
conducting hearings on often technical subjects to the engagement in these efforts of 
hundreds of committee staff members—and thousands more at the Government 
Accountability Office, Congressional Research Service, and other legislative support 
agencies.140 Further, separate from committee staff, legislators’ personal staff 
members often devote extensive time to oversight functions, including preparing 
their political principals for hearings.141 
Yet much of this activity, including most of the hundreds of hearings held 
each year, does not make headlines. So why do legislators devote these resources to 
oversight, incurring opportunity costs for the use of their time and salary space in 
their staff budgets? Simply put, this Article posits that legislators expend resources 
on oversight because oversight can get results.  
B. Research Design 
Foundations 
Each agency action that is a plausible candidate for congressional attention 
varies on two dimensions: congressional attention and recurrence. This variance 
allows for evaluation of the consequences of oversight hearings, by comparing the 
                                                     
140 See WILLIAM WEST, CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY 131-32 (1995); RICHARD HALL, 
PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 138 (1996). 
141 See ABERBACH, supra note 20, at 55. That legislators often utilize their personal staff for 
committee oversight constitutes a revealed preference. Because members of Congress receive a single 
lump sum for all personal staff compensation, every dollar spent on oversight work, including 
preparing for hearings, that personal staff members conduct is one less dollar that can be used, e.g., 
for constituent service. See Ida A. Brudnick, Members’ Representational Allowance: History and 
Usage, CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS, June 22, 2015, at 10.  
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recurrence rate of infractions that lead to oversight hearings with the recurrence rate 
for otherwise similar infractions that do not. 
Once again, TREAD Act implementation is illustrative. Table 2 identifies 
four problems with NHTSA’s implementation of the Act, all of which were derived 
from the DOT Inspector General’s January 2002 report.142 The table classifies each 
issue based on whether Congress held a hearing and whether the issue persisted. 
Table 2: Typology of TREAD Act Implementation Issues 
 Hearing Held No Hearing Held 
 
 
Issue Resolved  
 
(1) 
Defect information system 
not created by deadline 
 
 
(3) 
Peer review needed 
 
Issue Persisted 
 
(2) 
Tire pressure warning rule 
not created by deadline 
 
(4) 
Cost overruns 
 
TREAD Act implementation provides examples of all four possible situations 
included in Table 2. First, recall that the Department of Transportation’s Inspector 
General faulted NHTSA for its inaction in creating a new defect information 
system.143 The next month, a House oversight panel strongly criticized the agency 
for this failure.144 NHTSA completed the first phase of the system later that year, and 
the agency’s first recall based on the system occurred in 2004.145 Accordingly, this 
issue is placed in Box (1) in Table 2; Congress held a hearing, and the issue was 
resolved. 
Second, NHTSA’s failure to publish in a timely manner a rule requiring 
automakers to install tire pressure warning systems also provoked legislators’ ire, but 
did not change agency behavior. The TREAD Act required the agency to complete a 
                                                     
142 See OIG, Review of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 6. 
143 Id. 
144 Hearing, Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 5-6 (Statement of Full Committee 
Ranking Member, and TREAD Act co-sponsor, John D. Dingell (D-MI)); id. at 28 (Statement of 
Subcommittee Chair Cliff Stearns (R-FL)). 
145 See OIG, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 8, at 5; McDonald, 
Separations, Blow-outs, and Fallout, 37 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. at 1177-78.  
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rulemaking, by November 1, 2001, for a regulation requiring “a warning system in 
new motor vehicles to indicate . . . when a tire is significantly under inflated.”146 The 
Inspector General’s January 2002 report criticized the agency for failing to issue a 
final rule.147 Legislators seized on this delay—and also faulted the agency for 
indications from the notice-and-comment period that the agency was receptive to 
undercutting the warning-system requirement—during the February 2002 hearing.148 
On June 5, 2002, NHTSA published a final rule, which, after an additional 
delay, would require select vehicles to include a pressure sensor on at least one 
tire.149 The Second Circuit held that the rule’s allowance for automakers to forgo a 
warning system on all but one tire was contrary to the TREAD Act’s unambiguous 
text per Chevron and arbitrary and capricious per State Farm.150 With the rule 
vacated, the Inspector General’s September 2004 report noted that rulemaking was 
still ongoing—over 2 1/2 years after the hearing and almost three years after the 
statutorily imposed deadline.151 Accordingly, this issue is placed in Box (2) in the 
table; although oversight occurred concerning both perceived weaknesses in the 
then-proposed rule and delays in its completion, this oversight was not effective. 
Third, the Inspector General’s January 2002 report faulted NHTSA for 
inconsistent decisions concerning whether recalls are warranted, and recommended 
that the agency institute a form of peer review among its analysts.152 Legislators did 
not broach this subject in the February 2002 hearing or, indeed, in any other hearing. 
The Inspector General, however, raised the subject sua sponte during the February 
2002 session—to commend the agency for its responsiveness.153 Because this issue 
                                                     
146 Pub. L. No. 106–414, § 13, 114 Stat. at 1806. 
147 See OIG, Review of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 6, at ii-v, 3, 30. 
148 See Hearing, Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 2 (Statement of Subcmte. Chair 
Cliff Stearns); id. at 6 (Statement of Rep. Ed Bryant); id. at 10 (Prepared Statement of Cmte. Chair 
Billy Tauzin); id. at 32 (Statement of Rep. Fred Upton); id. at 34 (Statement of Rep. Bart Gordon). 
149 49 C.F.R. § 571.138 pt. S4.2 (2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 38704, 38722-23 (June 5, 2002) (final rule).  
Further, the rule be phased-in gradually over this three year period; it would not apply to a most new 
vehicles until the second year. 67 Fed. Reg. at 38706, 38708-38709, 38722-38738; 66 Fed. Reg. at 
38989-95. Finally, the rule did not specify any requirements after a three-year window. Id. at 38722. 
150 Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Mineta, 340 F.3d 39, 62 (2d Cir. 2003). The court permitted the rule’s 
incremental phase-in period to stand, however. See id. 
151 See OIG, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 8, at 4, 9-10.  
152 See OIG, Review of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 6, at x, 13-16. 
153 See Hearing, Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 6 (Statement of Inspector General 
Kenneth M. Mead). 
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was resolved without congressional intervention, it appears in Box (3). 
Fourth, the Inspector General’s report criticized NHTSA for cost overruns 
associated with implementing that Act.154 Not only did legislators ignore this critique 
during oversight hearings, but one legislator faulted NHTSA for spending too little 
money on implementation.155 Unsurprisingly, NHTSA’s failures to contain costs 
reappeared in the Inspector General’s September 2004 report.156 This issue, which 
Congress ignored and which persisted, belongs in Box (4). 
A naïve analysis of the impact of oversight would compare the recurrence 
rates of issues that receive congressional attention with those that do not. This 
strategy, however, ignores the facts that neither the probability of selection for 
oversight hearings nor the likelihood of “correction”—either post-oversight or, if no 
hearings are held, at some future point—is uniform across subjects. 
Consider that peer review is likely the most tractable issue included in Table 
2. Requiring analysts to check each other’s work involves few tradeoffs; given that 
NHTSA employed eight analysts in 2004,157 even doubling the staff to conduct peer 
reviews would not be budget-busting. By contrast, Boxes (1) and (2) involve the 
issuance of highly technical regulations for which NHTSA is required to consider 
costs to automakers when crafting the rules,158 and Box (4)’s imperative to reduce 
the agency’s outlays may place other program goals at risk.  
Because issue areas differ in terms of both their suitability for oversight 
hearings and their tractability, straightforward comparisons across these four 
categories are impractical. Instead, one must compare the recurrence rate of issues 
that are subject to oversight with otherwise similar issues that Congress ignores. The 
remainder of this subpart describes how this comparison is made.  
Connecting Infractions to Hearings and to Later Infractions 
Part II.B, supra, introduced two new datasets: on agency infractions and 
oversight hearings. In this Part, I use these datasets to examine the recurrence rate of 
                                                     
154 See OIG, Review of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 6, at viii-iv, 5-9. 
155 See Hearing, Implementation of the TREAD Act, supra note 7, at 6 (Statement of Rep. Dingell). 
156 See OIG, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects Investigation, supra note 8, at 2-7, 10-11, 14. 
157 See id. at 3. 
158 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring notice and comment for substantive rulemakings); Exec. Order 
12866 (mandating cost-benefit analysis for same); OIG, Follow-up Audit of the Office of Defects 
Investigation, supra note 8, at 9 (describing the technical nature of the defect information system). 
Congress in the Administrative State 
 
42 
 
infractions that are subject to hearings with the recurrence rate of otherwise similar 
infractions that are not.  First, I determine whether each infraction in the first dataset 
is connected to a hearing in the second dataset. I code each infraction on two 
dimensions: the targeted agency and the specific subject area, e.g., problems with 
intergovernmental grants, under-enforcement concerns, etc.159 I then code each 
hearing along the same two dimensions. Whenever an infraction and hearing are 
assigned the same subject-area and agency code and the hearing occurred within the 
12 months following the first mention on the infraction, I consider this particular 
infraction to be the subject of that hearing. Finally, for each infraction (and 
regardless of whether a hearing occurred), I determined whether an infraction with 
the same agency and subject-matter codes reappeared in the infractions dataset in the 
13 to 24 months following the initial infraction. Thus, this process identifies, for 
each infraction, (i) whether the infraction led to a hearing and (ii) whether the 
infraction reoccurred.  
Method 
To test the hypothesized causal relationship between oversight hearings and 
agency recidivism, one cannot simply compare agency recidivism concerning 
infractions that were and were not subject to hearings, because infractions in these 
two groups likely differ in other ways that may be correlated with recidivism. 
Neither is conventional regression analysis, with a set of variables controlling for 
these other potential differences in infractions, appropriate.160 Accordingly, I use 
genetic matching, a statistical method that allows for the evaluation of causal claims. 
While it is impossible for a given infraction to simultaneously both receive and not 
receive the “treatment” of an oversight hearing, matching provides a second-best 
alternative for causal inference; it allows the analyst to identify a control observation 
that is as similar as possible to a given treated observation concerning a set of 
observable, pre-treatment covariates but for the fact that the control observation did 
not receive the treatment.161  
                                                     
159 See supra note 89 (listing the 42 subject areas). 
160 Because regression analysis involves the minimization of squared errors, marginal observations are 
heavily weighted. This feature presents a problem where, as here, there are many observations in one 
category that are extremely unlike observations in the other category, and thus cannot be “controlled 
for” with a set of variables.  For instance, because it would be absurd to think that a Watergate-style 
event would not lead to at least one hearing, including such an event in a linear regression would lead 
to biased estimates, regardless of the quality and quantity of the control variables or the weighting 
scheme for outlying observations. Matching, by contrast, places emphasis on observations that have 
similar covariates, so that extreme or marginal observations might receive no weight at all. 
161 The causal effect of treatment τ on unit i is given by τi = Yi1—Yi0, where Yi1 is the potential 
outcome if i receives treatment and Yi0 is the potential outcome if i does not. Assuming that the 
process by which an observation i is selected into the treatment or control group is determined by Xi (a 
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Genetic matching, specifying one-to-one matching with replacement, is the 
most appropriate matching method for this analysis, based on the properties of some 
of the covariates on which it is important to achieve balance.162 The genetic 
matching algorithm identifies a suitable set of ignored infractions to compare to the 
set of infractions are are subject to at least one hearing, so that the distributions of the 
two groups will be comparable in terms of a variety of specified confounding 
factors.163  
Covariates 
                                                                                                                                                      
set of observable, pre-treatment covariates), it is possible to estimate the average treatment effect for 
the treated (ATT) as:  
   | (T = 1) = E[E(Yi | Xi, Ti = 1)—E(Yi | Xi, Ti = 0)] 
where Ti is a treatment indicator, with a value of 1 if i is in the treatment regime and 0 otherwise. As 
the above equation shows, calculating the ATT for observational data requires pairing treated 
observations with untreated ones in terms of the covariates in X. Matching algorithms do just this: 
pairing each treated unit with a closely-matched control unit. See Jasjeet Sekhon, Opiates for the 
Matches: Matching Methods for Causal Inference, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 487 (2009) (providing an 
overview of matching methods). 
162 Since most of the covariates are discrete, the Equal Percent Bias Reduction (EPBR) property does 
not hold. Because multivariate matching based on Mahalanobis distance, propensity score matching 
via logistic regression, and other affinely invariant matching methods all require that this property be 
met, the fact that some covariates are discrete means that using these methods would result in greater 
bias. Jasjeet Sekhon, Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with Automated Balance 
Optimization: The Matching Package for R, 42 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 1, 30 (2011). Genetic matching, 
by contrast, does not require that EPBR hold. Genetic matching also compares favorably to propensity 
score and Mahalanobis distance matching in terms of bias and mean squared error reduction; it also 
does not require any parametric assumptions. See id. (providing an overview of the GenMatch 
function); Sekhon, Opiates for the Matches, supra note (noting that this procedure minimizes the 
largest covariate discrepancy between treatment and control groups, i.e., it maximizes covariate 
balance). 
163 See Alexis Diamond & Jasjeet Sekhon, Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal Effects: A 
General Multivariate Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Observational Studies, Working 
Paper, available at sekhon.berkeley.edu/papers/GenMatch.pdf. To provide a bit more technical detail 
regarding the research design: Wi is a binary treatment indicator, coded as 1 if infraction i was dealt 
with in an oversight hearing during the twelve months following its first mention, and zero otherwise. 
X is a (n x k) matrix of k covariates and n infractions. Yi(0) denotes the number of times infraction i 
would be mentioned in the four sources—IG reports, GAO lists, Times and Journal editorials—
subsequent to the initial 12 month period if the infraction is not taken up in an oversight hearing 
during the 12 months following its initial mention. Yi(1) represents the number of times i  would be 
mentioned in these four sources if a hearing is held concerning i. Thus, Yi(0) and Yi(1) are “potential 
outcomes,” representing the likelihood of issue i reappearing, with and without hearings. Assuming 
unconfoundedness given the observed covariates—i.e., that, conditional on the observed covariates, 
units are assigned to the treated group in a manner independent of outcomes—the average treatment 
effect for the treated is: τATT = E(Yi(1)—Yi(0) | Wi = 1. 
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This analysis matches on 11 factors that, taken together, capture the process 
by which units are assigned to treatment.164 Specifically, the analysis includes three 
covariates that capture the preference alignment among agency, committee, and 
Congress (Agency-Committee Alignment, Committee-Chamber Alignment, and 
Agency-Chamber Alignment); one covariate that captures background political 
circumstances (Congress, i.e., the two-year period in the which the infraction 
occurred); three covariates that relate to agency characteristics (Executive Order, 
Regulatory Function, Defense / Foreign Affairs Function); three that measure the 
salience of the infraction (NYT Mentions, WSJ Mentions, Total Mentions); and one 
that captures the topic of the infraction (Subject Matter). 
As discussed supra Part II, the relative preferences of Congress, the 
committee, and the agency all impact the committee’s decision to hold oversight 
hearings. These inter-actor relationships are captured in the Agency-Committee 
Alignment, Committee-Chamber Alignment, and Agency-Congress Alignment 
covariates.165  
Congress, a dummy variable taking values corresponding to the 102nd 
through 112th Congresses, is an especially important covariate, because it contains 
information concerning a wide variety of relevant features of the political system, 
e.g., the presence of divided government, the national mood, and the majority party 
leadership’s macro-level oversight goals. 
Executive Order captures whether the agency was created via an executive 
order, department secretarial order, or executive branch-initiated reorganization plan 
after 1946.166 According to William Howell & David Lewis, agencies that were 
created via unilateral executive action are typically designed so as to maximize 
                                                     
164 The use of the terms of “treatment” and “control” is consistent with the nomenclature in matching 
studies involving observational data in the social sciences. See, e.g., Gary King & Richard Nielsen, 
Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for Matching, Working Paper (Dec. 16, 2016), at *1, 
available on-line at gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/psnot.pdf (last accessed Aug. 5, 2017). I do 
not suggest that the two groups are identical, which is rarely possible in non-experimental settings.  
165 As in Part II, subcommittee preferences are estimated using subcommittee chairs’ ideal point 
estimates based on Common Space DW-NOMINATE scores, and agency preferences are captured by 
Johnson-Chen scores.  
166 These data were obtained from a dataset created by David Lewis for agencies created between 
1946 and 1997. See David E. Lewis, Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Code Book, available 
at IQSS Dataverse Network, 
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:1902.1/10129&studyListing
Index=0_d1de20ebf2b96353b798a93359b8. I supplemented this dataset by researching agencies 
created between 1998 and 2012. Given that the creation of new agencies by unilateral executive action 
is a relatively recent phenomenon, agencies created before 1946 were coded as a zero.  
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presidential control.167 Given this Congress-subverting purpose, structural 
differences between agencies with a statutory basis and those without may influence 
the relative susceptibility of these two types of agencies to oversight. 
Regulatory Function reflects whether a majority of the programs that the 
agency administers are regulatory in nature.168 Whether an agency primarily 
performs a regulatory function may affect its assignment to treatment, as the often 
highly complex subject matter that regulatory agencies address may indicate that the 
legislature’s hidden information problem is particularly acute. Thus, oversight could 
be a more potent mechanism for information revelation for regulatory agencies. 
Defense / Foreign Affairs Function refers to whether the agency’s primary 
mission involves defense, foreign policy, international trade or foreign aid.169 
Although the evidence is mixed, some scholars contend that Congress adopts a more 
deferential posture towards the executive branch concerning foreign affairs.170  
NYT Mentions and WSJ Mentions are event counts of the number of times 
these newspapers published a critical editorial concerning the agency infraction in 
the 12 months following its first mention in any of the four sources. Taken together, 
these covariates provide a crude measure of issue salience and media or public 
attention, from sources considered to be left- and right-of-center, respectively. Total 
Mentions in Year t is an event count of the number times that all four sources 
criticize the agency regarding the infraction during the same 12 month period. This 
covariate provides an additional measure of issue salience among inside-the-Beltway 
actors. 
                                                     
167 William Howell and David E. Lewis, Agencies by Presidential Design, 64 J. POL. 1095, 1096 
(2002).  
168 See David E. Lewis, Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make Worse 
Bureaucrats?, 69 J. POL. 1073 (2007) (providing a description of OMB PART Management Grades, 
which include program categories for every federal program in existence during these years, as well as 
information specifying the agency in each program is located). I consider a agency to have a primarily 
regulatory function if this dataset classifies at least half of the programs that the agency administers as 
regulatory. 
169 The contents of this variable were obtained from the David Lewis dataset for those agencies 
establised between 1946 and 1997, and were entered based on the author’s own determinations for all 
other agencies, see Lewis, Administrative Agency Insulation Data Set Code Book, supra note 166. 
170 Compare LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995); with WILLIAM G. HOWELL AND JON 
PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 
(2007); John Yoo, Politics as Law? The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and 
Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 875 (2001). Bureaucracy experts also generally consider 
defense-focused agencies to have a more conservative outlook. Clinton & Lewis, supra note 104, at 
11. 
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Since one reasonably could expect infractions that are the subject of intense 
media attention to be more likely subjects of oversight hearings, including these 
three media-related covariates helps ensure that observations in the treated and 
control groups are balanced in terms of public attention. That media attention to an 
issue typically declines after an initial burst of coverage should not affect these 
results, assuming that the rate of decline for issues that are the subject of oversight is 
equivalent to the rate of decline for issues that are not subject to oversight. 
Finally, Subject Matter is a categorical variable. Each infraction is assigned 
one of 42 subject-matter codes, as listed in Footnote 89. 
I set the matching function to match exactly on the Congress and Subject 
Matter covariates and use the nearest match for all other covariates.171 Through this 
procedure, each infraction on which a committee held a hearing was matched with an 
infraction for which oversight did not occur. For each matched pair, both the treated 
and control infraction involved the same subject area and occurred during the same 
Congress. Further, the two groups of observations are closely matched in terms of (i) 
the alignment of political preferences among the agency, committee, and Congress; 
(ii) whether the agency was created via executive order; whether the agency 
performs (iii) a mostly regulatory or (iv) defense or foreign-relations functions; and 
the number of instances that year in which (v) the New York Times editorial page; 
(vii) the Wall Street Journal editorial page; or (vii) either newspaper’s editorial page 
mentioned the infraction.172 
                                                     
171 Finding an exact match for each treatment unit on Congress is particularly desirable for two 
reasons. First, as previously detailed, Congress is an particularly meaningful covariate, because it 
captures a wide variety of features in the political environment. Second, the temporal, discrete nature 
of this variable means that, in some circumstances, “close enough” is not adequate. Whereas, for 
instance, the analyst might be satisfied with a match where the control and treated units have slightly 
different values for, say, Agency-Congress Alignment, the same cannot necessarily be said for a pair 
where, e.g., one unit is in the Democrat-led 103rd Congress and the other is in the Republican-led 
104th Congress. 
172 To test for post-matching balance between the treated and control groups, I ran paired sample t-
tests, for differences in means, and bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, for differences in 
distributions, concerning each covariate. Across these tests, the lowest p-value reported is 0.129, 
which suggests that, using a strict p > 0.10 criterion, the matched groups can be considered balanced 
on the covariates. 
The matching function also substantially reduces standardized bias, or the mean difference 
between the two groups divided by the standard deviation in the treated group, for all covariates. Prior 
to matching, the standardized differences for three out of the 11 covariates exceed 20% precent. See 
Paul Rosenbaum & Donald Rubin, Constructing a Control Group Using Multivariate Matched 
Sampling Methods that Incorporate the Propensity Score, 39 AM. STATISTICIAN 33, 36 (1985) 
(classifying standardized differences greater than 20% as large). Post-matching, the largest 
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Having created the matched groups and asssessed balance,173 I then fit a 
series of logistic regression models on the matched data. These models include all of 
the previously mentioned covariates along with a dichotomous indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if a hearing was held within 12 months of the infraction’s first 
mention. The outcome variable is whether the infraction is mentioned against in the 
13-24 months following its first mention; standard errors are clustered by committee. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, several qualifications are in order. Most 
importantly, while the 11 included covariates capture significant considerations, they 
do not exhaust the potential ways in which infractions subject to oversight could 
differ from those that are ignored. For instance, infractions vary in importance to key 
donors or interest groups, not to mention as pet causes among legislators; yet 
operationalizing variation of these types is beyond this Article’s scope—and perhaps 
beyond the realm of possibility. Further, several of the included covariates are rough 
simulacra for the underlying concepts they seek to capture. For example, the number 
of references to the infraction in two major newspaper editorial pages is a crude 
proxy for salience, particularly as the media landscrape fractured during the study 
period. While acknowledging these shortcomings—which in some form are present 
in many observational studies—this Article nonetheless provides a first-cut 
assessment of a key potential mechanism for congressional influence in the 
administrative state. 
C. Results 
With each infraction for which a hearing was convened well-matched with an 
otherwise similar infraction for which oversight did not occur, direct measurement of 
the impact of congressional oversight on agency recidivism is possible. The top row 
in Figure 4, labeled “Model 1 (1991-2012),” reports the estimated effect of holding 
at least one hearing on whether there is at least one critical mention of the infraction 
in any of the four sources during the following 12 months, along with the associated 
95% confidence interval.  The second row, labeled “Model 2 (1991-2012),” reports 
this estimate only for the most politically salient infractions, i.e., those involving 
agency rulemakings, grant decisions, the agency’s posture toward client groups and 
regulated groups, and appointee competence and ethics.174 Subsequent rows show 
                                                                                                                                                      
standardized difference, for Defense / Foreign Affairs Function, is 1.0%. The fact that such close 
balance was achieved on these covariates presents a strong case for unconfoundedness. Even though 
treatment was not randomly assigned, one may say that it was not assigned on the basis of these 
covariates,  which capture a diverse set of factors related to the political climate, committee and 
agency political preferences, media attention and overall issue salience. 
173 See note 172. 
174 Recall from Part II.B that these subject areas correspond to categories 12-23 and 35-42 in Footnote 
 
Congress in the Administrative State 
 
48 
 
the estimated effects from running separate models (all of which include the full set 
of infractions) for each combination of President and House party majority during 
the 1991-2012 period.175 
 
Figure 4: Effects of Hearings on Future Infractions,  
by President & House of Representative Majority Party 
Obama - GOP
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Unit of analysis: agency infraction. Treatment: whether at least one hearing was held 
concerning the infraction in the 12 months following the infraction’s mention. Outcome 
variable: whether the infraction is mentioned at least once in the 12 months following treatment. 
Study period: 102nd-112th Congresses (1991-2012). Bars signify 95% confidence intervals, 
which were derived using committee-clustered standard errors. 
Full model contains 14,431 observations and 5,202 treated observations (all of which were 
matched), and 4,992 unweighted matched observations, i.e., control-group observations. (Two 
hundred and ten control-group observations were matched with more than one treated 
observation; an additional 4,237 control observations were not matched with any treated 
observation, and thus were excluded.) Models estimated via logistic regression. 
As Figure 4 shows, when a hearing is held concerning an infraction, that 
                                                                                                                                                      
89). 
175 These models were run without the Congress covariate. 
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infraction is less likely to reappear in the four sources than are similar infractions 
that do not receive oversight attention. Overall, oversight attention is associated with 
an 18.5% reduction in the likelihood of recurrence across all infractions (Model 1).  
For the most politically salient infractions (Model 2), the estimated reduction is 
14.6%—although the associated 95% confidence interval crosses zero, indicating 
that we cannot reject the null result at this level. 
Remarkably, these results persist during periods of both unified and divided 
government. Figure 4 also shows that hearings are associated with a 7.3% to 22.9% 
reduction in agency recidivism for all partisan combinations during this period 
(although two of these estimates are not statistically significant). Contrary to 
expectations based on the view that inter-branch competition will be most intense 
when different parties control the branches,176 there does not appear to be a 
discernable difference between the recidivism rates in periods of unified versus 
divided government. 
To put the magnitude of these effects in perspective, infractions that are not 
subject to hearings have a 40.9% likelihood of recurrence in the next year; 
infractions that are subject to hearings have a 33.3% likelihood of recurrence. To 
better understand how this average 18.5% reduction in agency recidivism affects the 
absolute number of agency infractions, Figure 5 provides the predicted probabilities 
of infractions that were subject to hearings reappearing in the infractions dataset in 
the 13-24 months after their appearance, compared to the predicted probabilities for 
infractions that Congress ignored. As the estimates in the bottom-left corner of 
Figure 5 show, infractions that appear once in a given year and are not subject to 
hearings have a 33% predicted probability of recurrence, whereas infractions that 
appear once in a given year but are subject to hearings have a 25% probability of 
recurrence—a 24.2% reduction for infractions that appear only once in a given year. 
As Figure 5 illustrates, infractions that appear more than once in a given year 
are more likely to reappear in subsequent years, perhaps because infractions that 
receive greater attention from the four sources are more difficult to resolve. Still, for 
infractions that are mentioned between two and seven times in one year, the 
probability that the infraction is mentioned the next year is lower when oversight 
occurs. In most cases, this lower likelihood of recurrence is statistically significant, 
as the lack of overlap in most of the 95% confidence intervals in Figure 5 conveys. 
 
                                                     
176 See Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2311 (2006). 
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Figure 5: Predicated Probability of Infraction Reappearing  
in Dataset in Year Following First Mention 
 
Figure reports simulated predicted probability of an infraction reappearing in the dataset in 
the 13-24 months following its appearance. X-axis denotes the number of times that the 
infraction appears in the dataset following its first appearance. Bars signify 95% 
confidence intervals. Quantities of interest estimated by running 1000 simulations in Zelig 
using a logistic regression model and holding Subcommittee Preferences and Agency 
Preferences covariates at their means; Executive Order, Regulatory Function, and Def. / 
For. Affairs Function at their modes; and NYT Mentions and WSJ Mentions at their 
medians. See King, et al., Zelig, supra Figure 3. Unit of analysis: agency infractions. 
(Infractions from all 42 categories in Footnote 89 are included.) Bars signify 95% 
confidence intervals, which were derived using committee-clustered standard errors. 
Assessing whether an 18.5% reduction indicates that oversight hearings are 
consequential raises the question: compared to what? As discussed in Part I.A, 
supra, Congress possesses various carrots and sticks for influencing agency 
behavior. The importance of these other tools, ranging from informal legislator-
administrator contacts to GAO reports detailing agency misbehavior, should not be 
discounted. On the other hand, these tools may derive their impact, at least in part, 
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from the fact that they are deployed in the shadow of potential oversight hearings. 
Regardless, this Part simply reports the marginal effect of oversight hearings, 
whether those hearings occur in isolation or in combination with other means of 
influence. 
Naturally, the lack of quantifiable “success rates” for these other tools 
hinders the assessment of the relative impact of oversight hearings compared to these 
other measures. In absolute terms, the magnitude of an 18.5% reduction is in the eye 
of the beholder. At least to this observer, though, the notion that a small subset of 
legislators may be able to exert influence on the administrative state—which is 
alternatively considered a co-equal fourth branch of government or the object of 
growing presidential control— without passing a statute is noteworthy. 
Conducting similar analyses for limited subsets of these infractions data 
yields similar results as reported in the full model—albeit often just on the wrong 
side of the conventionally accepted p < 0.05 level of statistical significance. As 
discussed above, Model 2 in Figure 4 reports that oversight hearings are associated 
with an estimated 14.6% reduction in the recurrence rate for a politically salient 
subset of infractions (with a standard error of 0.084 associated with this 0.146 point 
estimate).  
Running separate models for infractions in each of the 42 subject areas yields 
negative estimates for almost all models. Almost all these estimates are far from 
conventionally accepted levels of statistical significance, however, perhaps because 
of the relatively low number of observations in most categories. Accordingly, I 
reclassify the 42 subject areas into seven “super-categories,” each of which contains 
sufficient observations for analysis, and run a separate model for each of the seven 
super-categories. Figure 6 reports the effect estimates and corresponding 95% 
confidence intervals for each. Although, as Figure 6 shows, most of these intervals 
just barely include positive numbers, and thus are not statistically significant at the p 
< 0.05 level, all of the estimates except for “Civil Rights / Liberties Issues” are 
significant at the p < 0.10 level. 
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Figure 6: Effects of Hearings on Future Infractions, By Infraction Topic 
 
 
Unit of analysis: agency infraction. Unit of analysis: agency infractions. (Infractions from all 42 
categories in Footnote 89 are included.) Treatment: whether at least one hearing was held 
concerning the infraction in the 12 months following the infraction’s mention. Outcome variable: 
whether the infraction is mentioned at least once in the 12 months following treatment. Study 
period: 102nd-112th Congresses (1991-2012). Models estimated via logistic regression. Bars signify 
95% confidence intervals, which were derived using committee-clustered standard errors. 
 
The fact that oversight reduces bureaucratic recividism is noteworthy and, for 
those that believe that Congress ought to play an expanded role in administration, 
encouraging. Coupling with the findings in Part II concerning when oversight will 
occur, this result suggests several implications concerning the role of Congress in 
administration.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The basic conclusion from the preceding analyses is that, when undertaken, 
oversight can have a significant effect on agency behavior, but political constraints 
prevent oversight from occurring in many instances. The statement that oversight is 
conditionally impactful may seem a bit vexing. On the one hand, Part III 
demonstrates that oversight can be highly consequential, reducing the rate of 
recurrence of infractions by 18.5%. Considering that oversight hearings are 
sometimes dismissed as little more than venues for political posturing, this finding is 
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noteworthy, and should be cause for optimism among those that see congressional 
engagement with the administrative state as important.177 Moreover, Part II shows 
that outlier committees conduct oversight less frequently, mitigating the charge that 
committee-based oversight may distort agency action away from the median 
legislator’s preferences.  
On the other hand, Part II also suggests that principal-agent issues inherent in 
the relationship between Congress and its committees push overseers to be highly 
selective concerning which infractions they address. While the existence of a 
bifurcated principal does clip the wings of outlier committees, tempering their 
influence over administative outcomes, it also leads to fewer subjects being covered 
in hearings relative to what would be address with a system in which committees 
perfectly mirror floor preferences. Thus, committee oversight arguably does not fully 
reflect Congress’s priorities. 
What is one to make of these findings? The following sections discuss 
implications of the results presented supra. 
A. Committee-Chamber Relations 
Congress-agency interactions are best thought of not as a clear principal-
agent relationship, but instead as a relationship where the cooperation of two 
actors—the committee and Congress—which together can be considered the 
principal, may be necessary for effective oversight. According to J.R. DeShazo & 
Jody Freeman, congressional involvement in administration involves a “double 
delegation,” in which Congress transfers ex ante policymaking authority to agencies, 
and entrusts responsibility for ex post monitoring of this first delegation to 
congressional committees and subcommittees—with principal-agent problems 
ingrained in both delegations.178  
Concerning this second delegation, the finding in Part II that preference 
divergence between committees and their parent chamber is associated with less 
frequent oversight suggests that slack exists in the principal-agent relationship 
                                                     
177 Because this analysis only considers the effects of completed oversight hearings, it may 
underestimate oversight’s impact. Much like the threat of litigation brings potential defendants—
mindful of the frictional costs involved in a legal defense—to the settlement table, the threat of 
oversight hearings—with their own attendant frictional costs—may convince agencies to comply with 
committee demands. In this way, oversight’s “second face of power” influences agency behavior 
without the need for any observable action by the committee. Cf. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. 
Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 947 (1962). 
178 DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1444-46. 
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between Congress and its committees. The functional split between committees, 
which are responsible for oversight, and Congress, which alone is authorized to 
punish agencies should they ignore committee overseers, limits the set of topics on 
which strategic committees will engage on oversight. 
This feature of Congress has implications concerning the comprehensiveness 
of oversight, raising questions concerning the importance of oversight as a means of 
congressional control over the administrative state.179 Consider how oversight 
activity would differ if, hypothetically, there were no principal-agent problem 
between Congress and its committees, i.e., if committee preferences perfectly 
mirrored the floor. The status quo promotes the odd result of committees devoting 
less attention to overseeing agencies with differing preferences than the committee, 
because the committee recognizes that agencies with differing preferences are less 
likely to comply with committee demands following a hearing and more likely to 
court legislative sanctions.  But if committee preferences perfectly matches those of 
Congress, committees would not need to consider whether holding hearings would 
awaken a slumbering Congress to move policy away from committee preferences. 
Instead, agencies with policy preferences that are far from Congress’s (and its 
committees’) preferences would receive greater oversight attention, and agencies 
whose preferences are aligning with Congress’s (and its committees’) preferences 
would receive less attention. 
Slack in the principal-agent relationship between Congress and its 
committees prevents this more sensible behavior from occurring. The presence of a 
bifurcated congressional structure limits committees’ oversight activity, relative to 
the amount of activity that would occur if committees were perfect agents of 
Congress. With this bifurcated principal, a strategic committee will restrict the set of 
agencies or topics that it monitors, as the committee’s preferences diverge from those 
of other relevant actors. Under certain conditions, a committee with either a 
sufficiently different political outlook than Congress or than an agency within its 
jurisdiction may choose to ignore agency behavior that the committee opposes. Thus, 
two principal-agent problems hamper Congress’s ability to control the administrative 
                                                     
179 See Beermann, supra note 11, at 142-43 (noting that oversight “may allow for too much deviation 
from the terms of the legislative program and from the preferences of Congress as a whole given that 
oversight does not include the discipline of public majority votes in Congress … There are reasons to 
be wary of a system [allowing] … small groups within Congress to shape administrative action.”); 
DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1447 (“Double delegation creates a serious risk … that agency 
decision-making … will be driven by the interest of small sub-majorities of Congress.”); Jonathan T. 
Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of 
Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1291 (2002) (doubting that 
“oversight committees accurately reflect the views of the House or Senate as a whole”). 
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state: (i) Congress’s delegation of policymaking power to agencies leads to one form 
of agency cost, and (ii) the branch’s delegation of the task of monitoring the 
administrative state to its committees leads to a second form.180 
B. Majoritarianism 
A pessimistic reading of these findings suggests that Congress cannot control 
delegated powers via committee-based action, since the presence of a bifurcated 
principal leads committees to ignore agencies that Congress, in the aggregate, would 
prefer to actively monitor. Under this view, Congress’s “double delegation”—of 
policymaking authority to agencies and of policy oversight to its committees—
suggests a failure to ensure that policy outcomes reflect Congress’s will, either via 
detailed statutory enactments or through ex post monitoring that reflects the 
preferences of the legislative branch.181 
A more balanced interpretation, however, notes the presence of a subtle 
majoritarian dynamic in the oversight dilemma. As Part II shows, committees devote 
greater attention to oversight when their preferences are more closely aligned with 
those of the parent chamber. That committees’ oversight decisions are made with an 
eye towards the larger legislature indicates a degree of committee responsiveness to 
its principal. 
This responsiveness provides a rejoinder to scholars that, pointing to the 
unrepresentative nature of congressional committees, contend that the President 
ought to possess greater power over the administrative state.182 The argument for 
greater presidential control at Congress’s expense often begins with the premise that 
“congressional” control really means control by committees.183 Given the supposed 
unrepresentativeness of committees and their susceptibility to interest group 
capture,184 the argument continues, greater presidential control of administration is 
                                                     
180 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment 
on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111 (1992) (referring to a “drift tradeoff” in the design of mechanisms 
for continued congressional involvement in administration).  
181 See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1444-46. 
182 See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 
23 (1995). 
183 See Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1471, 1522-23 (2015). 
184 See Kagan, supra note 119, at 2336 (stating that committees have a “far more tenuous connection 
to national majoritarian preferences” than does the White House); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest 
Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) (similar). 
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preferable to an expanded role for congressional committees.185 
The results reported in Part II cast doubt on this critique. That oversight 
increases as committee and chamber preferences converge suggests instead that 
committee-based oversight involves some measure of accountability to Congress. 
Unrepresentative committees are not given free rein to impose their views on 
agencies. Rather, the prospect of committee-disfavored legislative action deters 
outlier committees from attempting to influence agencies within their jurisdictions 
via the oversight process. In this way, the presence of a bifurcated congressional 
principal serves as a majoritarian check on unrepresentative committees. 
C. Jurisdictional Redundancy 
To some observers, the fact that unrepresentative committees are less likely 
to use the oversight process to pull agencies towards their preferences may appear to 
be faint praise for the system. After all, this finding implies that agencies situated 
within the jurisdictions of unrepresentative committees may enjoy some degree of 
unfettered discretion. This feature, however, also suggests a benefit of Congress’s 
fragmented oversight system, in which multiple committees, in both chambers, share 
jurisdiction for many agencies.186 According to DeShazo & Freeman, “Congress is 
best viewed as a collection of rivals who vie for control over power delegated to 
agencies.”187 But while DeShazo & Freeman consider this competition among 
unrepresentative committees and subcommittees as creating “risk that submajorities 
will ultimately direct agency implementation,”188 the findings presented in this 
Article mollify their conclusion. The presence of multiple committees with 
overlapping jurisdictions may mitigate the possibility that preference divergence 
between the legislative branch and any one particular committee will leave some 
agencies unmonitored.  
This finding speaks to a debate regarding the impact of committees’ 
exclusive jurisdictional “property rights” on congressional capacity. Whereas one 
group of scholars critiques committee jurisdictional redundancy as inefficient, 
discouraging congressional involvement in administration and, thus, allowing the 
executive to act with fewer congressional checks,189 others acknowledge benefits to 
                                                     
185 See Calabresi, supra note 182, at 51 (“Congressional committee chairs are in many ways rival 
executives to the cabinet secretaries whose departments and personal offices they oversee.”). 
186 See KING, supra note 82, at 6. 
187 DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 15, at 1446. 
188 Id. at 1447. 
189 See Joshua D. Clinton, David E. Lewis, and Jennifer L. Selin, Influencing the Bureaucracy: The 
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jurisdictional fragmentation, including the decreased susceptibility of multiple 
entities to interest group capture and the increased likelihood that problems will be 
discovered with redundant safeguards.190 The existence of a bifurcated principal—
which limits committee oversight activity where the relevant committee’s ideological 
outlook diverges from from that the target agency or Congress—suggests an 
additional benefit of duplicative committees; redundancy increases the likelihood 
that for at least one committee, the preference relationships between committee, 
chamber, and agency that are associated with more frequent oversight will be 
properly aligned. 
D. Checking the President 
These findings also suggest that a reconsideration of the dominant 
perspective concerning executive-congressional power dynamics is in order. Part III 
provides a partial corrective to popular accounts of the current balance of powers; 
Part II offers an institutional design strategy to militate against further executive 
aggrandizement. 
The notion that the executive branch plays an outsized role in governance, 
exercising legislative and judicial functions with few perceived checks from 
Congress or the courts, has gained wide currency in recent years.191 Presidential self-
aggrandizement, Congress’s routine delegation of lawmaking functions to executive 
agencies, and the Supreme Court’s willingness to abide these broad delegations so 
long as Congress provides a bare “intelligible principle” to guide agency 
                                                                                                                                                      
Irony of Congressional Oversight, 58 AM. J. POLI. SCI. 387 (2014); Patricia Wald & Neil Kinkopf, 
Putting Separation of Powers into Practice: Reflections on Senator Schumer’s Essay, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 41, 47 (2007); Beermann, supra note 11, at 122; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 104-07 (2004).  
190 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing 
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1691-99 (2006). Cf. RICHARD POSNER, 
PREVENTING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 36 (2005) (arguing 
that, without competition, agencies may grow complacent). 
191 See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2606 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting “the 
continuing aggrandizement of the Executive Branch”); City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 
1879 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]the danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed.”); supra note 14 (collecting citations to scholarly work). 
During the Obama administration, these concerns emanated mostly from conservatives. See, e.g., Josh 
Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, – ILL. L. REV. – (forthcoming, 2018). With the change in 
administration, the roles of conservatives as critics of, and progressives as abettors in, presidential 
aggrandizement likely will flip. See Adrian Vermeule, Two Futures for Administrative Law, Notice & 
Comment Blog, Nov. 30, 2016, available on-line at http://yalejreg.com/nc/two-futures-for-
administrative-law-by-adrian-vermeule/ (last accessed Jan. 2, 2017). 
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policymaking, when taken together, all reinforce the view of an executive ascendant, 
with Congress imposing few restrictions on its power.192 
While misgivings regarding trends in the relative power of the political 
branches are legitimate, the narrative of an enfeebled Congress unable to check an 
unbounded executive (except through the rare passage of new laws) is deficient.193 
As Part III of this Article shows, this account ignores Congress’s extra-legislative 
powers, including committee oversight of executive agencies, as a means of 
controlling administrative outcomes. 
Taken in tandem with Part III, Part II demonstrates that the structure and 
characteristics of the members of the committee system impact Congress’s ability to 
conduct oversight, and thus to exercise control over the executive branch. Findings 
that certain institutional design characteristics facilitate oversight may motivate 
Congress to reorganize along those lines to more vigorously check the White 
House.194 
E. Administrative Democracy 
Whereas some scholars worry that the President plays too large of a role in 
the administrative state, others claim that holes in the President’s control over 
                                                     
192 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 742-75 (2001) (delineating the expansive 
terms of the nondelegation doctrine); Watts, supra note 114, at 1003 (noting Congress’s sweeping 
delegations to agencies); Kagan, supra note 119 (describing the President’s growing role in the 
administrative state). 
193 While no scholar has, to my knowledge, argued that the executive is completely unbound, many 
have noted a massive transfer in power, with supposedly few checks, from Capitol Hill to the White 
House. See supra note 14; see also Eric Posner, The Executive Unbound, Trump Ed., 
ERICPOSNER.COM, available on-line at http://ericposner.com/the-executive-unbound-trump-ed/ (last 
accessed Aug. 4, 2017) (stating that, “[w]hile … some passages [of The Executive Unbound] may 
have led readers to think that the book imagines that the president is subject to literally no constraints 
from Congress and the courts, that was never the argument”). 
194 Would legislators want to reorganize Congress’s committee system to better control the executive 
branch? In light of the current unified Republican control of the political branches, the notion that 
legislators desire to better check the President may seem far-fetched. See Levinson & Pildes, supra 
note 176. Even in the current partisan climate, however, majority-party members of Congress possess 
an electoral incentive to monitor the executive branch—lest problems fester and voters blame 
incumbents in both of the political branches. Further, some legislators, motivated by a sense of 
institutional loyalty, genuinely may consider recalibrating the balance-of-powers to be a worthy 
policy goal in itself. See SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM, supra note 128 (on entrepreneurial 
legislators pursuing institutional reforms based on a combination of personal ambition and concern 
over Congress’s institutional prestige); accord David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties 
in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. – (forthcoming, 2018).  
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administration leave agencies without sufficient democratic checks.  At least since 
the New Deal era, judges and commentators have charged that Congress’s 
delegations of policymaking authority to administrative agencies create a 
democratically unaccountable “fourth branch” of government.195  
Since that period, a central project of administrative law has involved 
reconciling the practical reality of a technocratic administrative state with 
democratic, liberal-legalistic values.196 In previous generations, this effort 
emphasized designing administrative procedures to encourage public participation in 
administrative decision-making.197 Later expansion of access to the courts helped 
ensure that agencies adhere to these public-minded procedural requirements.198  
More recently, scholars have argued that the fact that a democratically 
elected President heads the executive branch provides some redress for the 
administrative state’s supposed “democratic deficit.”199 For instance, Elena Kagan 
(writing years prior to her investiture) claimed that “presidential control of 
administration … possesses advantages over any alternative control device in 
advancing … core democratic values.”200  
Indeed, the administrative state’s connection to a democratically elected 
President provides a rationale for the judiciary’s deferential posture in reviewing 
agency activity. Most notably, in granting agencies wide latitude in interpreting 
ambiguous statutes, the Chevron Court explained: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the 
                                                     
195 See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 
440 (2003). 
196 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[O]ur jurisprudience has been driven by 
a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and 
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under 
broad general directives”). 
197 See Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253, 260-65 
(2017). 
198 See id. 
199 See id. at 260 (referring to this concept as a “democracy deficit”) 
200 Kagan, supra note 112, at 2332; see also Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the 
Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New 
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 500 (1987). 
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competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not 
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged 
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.201 
To the extent that Chevron and its progency are rooted in these dual links 
between (i) agencies and the President and (ii) the President and the public, 
skepticism regarding either of these links call into question the doctrine’s continued 
viability. The Court raised such doubts in Free Enterprise Fund. In that case, the 
Court stated that “[t]he growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields vast 
power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the concern that it 
may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the people.”202 By this 
view, the President provides the democratic bridge between the administrative state 
and the people—and this connection is precarious.203 Justices Clarence Thomas and 
Neil Gorsuch express similar concerns.204 
The notion that only presidential control can redress the administrative state’s 
democratic deficit is puzzling. Ex post congressional involvement in administration 
is real and significant; committee-based oversight provides Congress with an 
ongoing means of influencing agency behavior. Administrative lawyers and scholars 
have pushed for changes in administrative procedures, judicial doctrine, and 
executive branch structures as means of increasing democratic accountability in the 
administrative state.205 Greater attention to redesigning congressional structures to 
                                                     
201 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
202 Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010) (Roberts, C.J). 
203 Chief Justice Roberts elaborated on these views in dissent. See City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 
S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2013) (“[A]gencies enjoy … a significant degree of independence … [N]o 
President could … supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity”) (quotation and citation omitted) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1879 (“It would be a bit much to describe [agency discretion under 
Chevron] as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state cannot be dismissed”) (citation omitted). 
204 Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1254 (2015) (“We have overseen and 
sanctioned the growth of an administrative system that concentrates the power to make laws and the 
power to enforce them in the hands of a vast and unaccountable administrative apparatus that finds no 
comfortable home in our constitutional structure.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in the the judgment); 
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Add to [the combination of 
legislative, judicial, and executive functions in agencies] the fact that … agencies wield vast power 
and are overseen by political appointees (but often receive little effective oversight from the chief 
executive to whom they nominally report), and you have a pretty potent mix.”) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
205 See Jud Mathews, Minimally Democratic Administrative Law, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 605 (2016) 
(providing an overview of these efforts). 
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facilitate oversight could play a similar function.  
The prospect of Congress filling gaps in the other branches’ oversight is 
particularly promising in areas in which courts are particularly reticent to act. For 
instance, under Heckler v. Chaney “agency decisions to refuse enforcement” is 
“general[ly] unsuitab[le] for judicial review.”206 This doctrine places a theoretically 
infinite set of non-actions outside of the courts’ field of vision. Yet Congress holds 
no such qualms about probing agencies’ decisions to refrain from acting.207 
I do not wish to seem Pollyannaish about the ability of oversight to “solve” 
the democratic deficit. An 18.5% reduction is not earth-shattering. But neither should 
we ignore Congress’s function as watchdog over the administrative state, which 
provides a measure—albeit limited—of democratic accountability to agency 
decision-making. Congressional oversight is one tool among many that can push 
agencies towards greater public accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
Through its oversight function, Congress plays an important—and often 
overlooked—role in the administrative state after the passage of laws. Although 
hearings do not directly compel agencies to act, the signal they provide to both 
targeted agencies and the larger legislative branch concerning the prospect of future 
legislative sanctions following continued non-compliance may persuade agencies to 
conform to committee preferences. In this way, Congress’s ability to conduct 
oversight can be placed among the branch’s set of persuasive, “soft powers.”208 
Whereas scholarship focused on lawmaking, the ex ante design of administrative 
procedures, and other formal means of control concludes that Congress has ceded 
considerable control over administration to the White House,209 this Article shows 
that, when certain conditions are met, ex post oversight can be remarkably impactful. 
This conclusion is subject to several caveats. Part III.B acknowledges, while 
                                                     
206 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
207 See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, How Credit Suisse Got Off Easy, NEWSWEEK, June 19, 2014, 
available on-line at http://www.newsweek.com/2014/06/27/how-credit-suisse-got-easy-255453.html 
(last accessed Jan. 2, 2017) (reporting that the DOJ, after a long period of inaction, entered into a plea 
agreement with a bank to pay a then-record criminal tax fine, shortly following a an oversight hearing 
at which Sen. Carl Levin’s “public bashing” of the DOJ “rattled” a DOJ witness).  
208 Cf. Chafetz, supra note 11; Gersen & Posner, supra note 17.  
209 See generally supra Part III; Beermann, Congressional Administration, supra note 11, at 64. 
 
Congress in the Administrative State 
 
62 
 
infractions in the “treatment” and “control” groups are substantially similar in 
important respects, they are not identical. (Neither could they be.) Because my 
research design aggregates individual infractions and hearings, each of which 
undoubtedly has unique characteristics, in the service of general conclusions, it 
necessarily ignores nuances present in any particular episode. Although this project 
is therefore incomplete, there is value in a first-cut assessment of the impact of 
oversight hearings in toto. 
Further, that oversight can be effective does not imply that it is efficient. 
Congress has many tools to influence agency behavior, from whistleblower statutes 
and the design of administrative structures to convention-based legislative vetoes and 
the newly reinvigorated Congressional Review Act. Whether oversight hearings lead 
to greater welfare gains within Congress than other mechanisms is beyond the 
Article’s scope. 
Although examining connections between oversight activity and the relative 
alignment of Congress, its committees, and executive agencies is a positive and 
descriptive project, the implications of this work are prescriptive. In an era of 
growing judicial concerns about democratic control over administration, oversight 
holds promise as a means of involving the popular branch in administrative decision-
making. Further, Congress can tailor its internal institutional design to enhance the 
role that the branch plays in administration. If Congress desires to strength its hand 
in administration, this Article provides a blueprint showing how to do so. 
